NLTK: Uncontrolled recursion in Toolbox settings helpers causes denial of service via deeply nested input
Root Cause
The Toolbox settings-tree helpers recurse over the parsed element tree without any depth
bound. _to_settings_string (nltk/toolbox.py:418), remove_blanks
(nltk/toolbox.py:432), add_default_fields (nltk/toolbox.py:451), _sort_fields
(nltk/toolbox.py:484), and add_blank_lines (nltk/toolbox.py:502,516) each recurse once
per element level with no depth counter or explicit stack. The producer
ToolboxSettings.parse builds the element tree iteratively, so nesting depth is driven
entirely by attacker-supplied \+marker / \-marker pairs.
Impact
An application that parses an untrusted Toolbox settings file and then serialises or
transforms it through any of the public helper functions aborts with an unhandled
RecursionError, terminating the affected operation or request worker (denial of service,
CWE-674). The recursion is pure Python, yielding a catchable RecursionError rather than
memory corruption or code execution. Confidentiality and integrity are unaffected.
Attack Chain
1. The application parses an untrusted settings file via ToolboxSettings.open_string /
open plus parse, producing an *N*-deep element tree; parsing is iterative and
completes without error.
2. The application passes the tree to a public helper , to_settings_string,
remove_blanks, add_default_fields, sort_fields, or add_blank_lines , as in...
Affected versions
| Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| nltk PyPI | < 3.10.4 | 3.10.4 |
Details and references
## Root Cause The Toolbox settings-tree helpers recurse over the parsed element tree without any depth bound. `_to_settings_string` (`nltk/toolbox.py:418`), `remove_blanks` (`nltk/toolbox.py:432`), `add_default_fields` (`nltk/toolbox.py:451`), `_sort_fields` (`nltk/toolbox.py:484`), and `add_blank_lines` (`nltk/toolbox.py:502,516`) each recurse once per element level with no depth counter or explicit stack. The producer `ToolboxSettings.parse` builds the element tree iteratively, so nesting depth is driven entirely by attacker-supplied `\+marker` / `\-marker` pairs. ## Impact An application that parses an untrusted Toolbox settings file and then serialises or transforms it through any of the public helper functions aborts with an unhandled `RecursionError`, terminating the affected operation or request worker (denial of service, CWE-674). The recursion is pure Python, yielding a catchable `RecursionError` rather than memory corruption or code execution. Confidentiality and integrity are unaffected. ## Attack Chain 1. The application parses an untrusted settings file via `ToolboxSettings.open_string` / `open` plus `parse`, producing an *N*-deep element tree; parsing is iterative and completes without error. 2. The application passes the tree to a public helper , `to_settings_string`, `remove_blanks`, `add_default_fields`, `sort_fields`, or `add_blank_lines` , as in the module's own parse-then-serialise round trip. 3. The helper recurses once per element level with no depth guard, consuming call-stack frames. This holds even when the helper's configuration dictionaries are empty. 4. Once the nesting depth exceeds the interpreter recursion limit, an unhandled `RecursionError` propagates out of the public API. ## Bypass Evidence Against the shipped source at the default recursion limit, a settings input nested 5 levels deep traverses cleanly through every helper, while a well-formed input nested 5000 levels deep drives each of the five helpers to an unhandled `RecursionError`; the iterative parse builds the 4999-deep tree without error, isolating the fault to the recursive helpers. The config-taking helpers (`add_default_fields`, `sort_fields`, `add_blank_lines`) recurse to failure even with empty configuration dictionaries. A repository-wide search confirms no depth guard exists anywhere in this module. ## Suggested Fix Cap nesting depth at the shared producer `ToolboxSettings.parse` (the choke point that builds the tree), or convert the five helpers to iterative traversals / add a shared recursion-depth bound, so all consumers are protected by one fix. Reported by pi (GitHub: @manus-pi). ## Fix status (2026-09-28) Status: MERGED on develop (unreleased; v3.10.3 of 2026-08-12 predates the fix). PR: #3885 "Bound recursion depth in parsers and traversal helpers" (ekaf), merged 2026-09-11, merge commit e521ecafc on develop. Fix commit: 0b6975377 (nltk/toolbox.py: the settings helpers stop at MAX_TOOLBOX_DEPTH=500 with ValueError). Probe: nltk/test/unit/security_probes/ghsa_f2h2_f4fc_p978.py (added in 2a6704952 on that PR); verdict on develop 2fa3f48fe: FIXED (bounded during parse (ValueError)). Release: none yet; no release tag contains e521ecafc.
- CVSS 3.1
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
- Severity from
- GitHub (reviewed advisory)
- Weakness
- CWE-674
- Also known as
- CVE-2026-129228