AI and data stack advisories

Severe, 6 weeks2431Projects328

2431 severe, 6 weeks · 328 projects

NLTKGHSA-g58v-j9g9-5gfg

NLTK corpus-reader view methods bypass the scoped root sandbox via intermediate-directory symlinks

NLTK

CVE-2026-128137 · Published Nov 19, 2026 · updated Nov 20, 2026

Medium5.5
Fix: upgrade to 3.10.4 or later
GitHub advisory

> affected: PyPI nltk >= 3.9.4 , CorpusReader.abspaths()/abspath() and the PlaintextCorpusReader / SyntaxCorpusReader view methods

> dynamically reproduced: nltk 3.9.4 (8/9, scoped-escape checks), 3.10.3 (wheel, 9/9 checks) and master 6818767b9 (9/9 checks)

---

_Source references (file:line) are to commit 303f6e2b (release tag v3.10.3). Line numbers in the released nltk wheel match this tag exactly; master 6818767b9 contains the same code (pathsec.py renumbered by +44 lines from added hardening comments). In 3.9.4 the same logic exists at earlier line numbers (api.py:222-236 for open(), api.py:161-203 for abspath()/abspaths(), data.py:382-388 for the pointer open, pathsec.py:105-114 for the scoped branch); the affected code is identical._

Summary

CorpusReader.open() (nltk/corpus/reader/api.py:235-257) is NLTK's hardened file-access entry point: after a lexical guard it calls validate_path(..., required_root=self._root) (api.py:246-249), and the scoped branch of pathsec.validate_path (nltk/pathsec.py:168-179) resolves symlinks and raises ValueError when the resolved target is not inside the corpus root. The view methods do not use this entry point: PlaintextCorpusReader.words/sents/paras (nltk/corpus/reader/plaintext.py:67-118) and...

Affected versions

PackageAffectedFixed in
nltk
PyPI
>= 3.9.4, < 3.10.43.10.4
Details and references

> **affected**: PyPI `nltk` `>= 3.9.4` , `CorpusReader.abspaths()`/`abspath()` and the `PlaintextCorpusReader` / `SyntaxCorpusReader` view methods > **dynamically reproduced**: `nltk` `3.9.4` (8/9, scoped-escape checks), `3.10.3` (wheel, 9/9 checks) and `master` `6818767b9` (9/9 checks) --- _Source references (`file:line`) are to commit `303f6e2b` (release tag `v3.10.3`). Line numbers in the released `nltk` wheel match this tag exactly; `master` `6818767b9` contains the same code (pathsec.py renumbered by +44 lines from added hardening comments). In `3.9.4` the same logic exists at earlier line numbers (`api.py:222-236` for `open()`, `api.py:161-203` for `abspath()`/`abspaths()`, `data.py:382-388` for the pointer open, `pathsec.py:105-114` for the scoped branch); the affected code is identical._ ### Summary `CorpusReader.open()` (`nltk/corpus/reader/api.py:235-257`) is NLTK's hardened file-access entry point: after a lexical guard it calls `validate_path(..., required_root=self._root)` (`api.py:246-249`), and the scoped branch of `pathsec.validate_path` (`nltk/pathsec.py:168-179`) resolves symlinks and raises `ValueError` when the resolved target is not inside the corpus root. The view methods do **not** use this entry point: `PlaintextCorpusReader.words/sents/paras` (`nltk/corpus/reader/plaintext.py:67-118`) and `SyntaxCorpusReader.parsed_sents/tagged_sents/sents/tagged_words/words` (`api.py:473-519`) build their streams from `self.abspaths(fileids, ...)` (`api.py:174-217`), which only does a lexical `self._root.join(fileid)` (`nltk/data.py:452-469`) and returns a `FileSystemPathPointer`. That pointer is opened via `FileSystemPathPointer.open()` → `pathsec.open(raw_path, "rb")` with `required_root` left at its default `None` (`data.py:438-447`, `nltk/pathsec.py:752,783`), so only the **global** allowed-roots check runs. The `O_NOFOLLOW` in `_hardened_open` (`pathsec.py:676-731`) protects only the final path component, so an **intermediate-directory symlink inside the corpus root** pointing at a sibling allowed root is followed by the kernel. **A caller who places such a symlink (or loads an untrusted corpus containing one) can read any file that `open()` would refuse , files outside the corpus root yet inside the global NLTK data sandbox , via `PlaintextCorpusReader.words([...])` / `SyntaxCorpusReader.words([...])` (and the `abspaths()`-returned pointer), defeating the scoped escape protection that GHSA-p4rw-class fixes and `test_required_root_blocks_symlink_escape` were added for.** ### Details Root cause: two sibling file-access channels on the same `CorpusReader` disagree about the scoped sandbox. 1. `CorpusReader.open()` (`api.py:235-257`) , the guarded channel: - Layer 1 lexical guard (`api.py:240-242`) rejects absolute paths and `..`. - Layer 2 scoped guard (`api.py:246-249`) calls `pathsec.validate_path(path, context="CorpusReader", required_root=self._root)`. - The `required_root` branch (`pathsec.py:168-179`) resolves the target with `Path(raw).resolve()` and raises `ValueError` when `target.is_relative_to(scoped_root)` is false. 2. The view-method channel , `abspaths()` → `FileSystemPathPointer` → `pathsec.open(required_root=None)`: - `CorpusReader.abspath()` (`api.py:174-183`) and `abspaths()` (`api.py:185-217`) return `self._root.join(f)` with **no** `validate_path` call. - `FileSystemPathPointer.join()` (`data.py:452-469`) only normalizes lexically (`normpath` + root-prefix `startswith`); it never calls `os.path.realpath`/`Path.resolve`, so the intermediate symlink is preserved verbatim. - `FileSystemPathPointer.open()` (`data.py:438-447`) calls `_secure_open(self._path, "rb")` (aliased from `pathsec.open`) with no `required_root`, so `pathsec.open` (`pathsec.py:752`) uses its default `required_root=None` and `validate_path` (`pathsec.py:783`) runs only the global allowed-roots check (`pathsec.py:181-207`). - Under `ENFORCE=True` + POSIX, `_hardened_open` (`pathsec.py:676-731`) o

CVSS 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Severity from
GitHub (reviewed advisory)
Weakness
CWE-59
Also known as
CVE-2026-128137

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