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Severe, 6 weeks2431Projects328

2431 severe, 6 weeks · 328 projects

NLTKGHSA-wr3g-j6qj-xpgh

NLTK: ZIP package extraction follows in-root hardlinks and overwrites files outside the NLTK data root

NLTK

CVE-2026-128135 · Published Nov 19, 2026 · updated Nov 20, 2026

High7.1
Fix: upgrade to 3.10.4 or later
GitHub advisory

Summary

NLTK ships a security wrapper, nltk.pathsec.ZipFile, that is meant to confine archive extraction to trusted data roots and to block link-based escapes. When nltk.download() installs a package, the extraction write opens each member's target path without checking whether that path is a hardlink to a file located outside the data root. A local actor who can write inside a shared or predictable NLTK data root (for example ~/nltk_data, a group-writable /usr/share/nltk_data, or a shared container volume) can pre-plant an in-root hardlink at a member path that a soon-to-be-installed package will write. When the victim later runs the download, extraction truncates and overwrites the outside-root target through that hardlink. This is the same weakness class as the previously fixed downloader hardlink issue, but the fix did not reach the package-extraction write sink, so the latest published release remains exploitable through this path.

Root Cause

The prior fix added an st_nlink > 1 refusal to the file-open helpers (nltk.pathsec.open / _hardened_open) and routed the downloader temporary-file write through that hardened opener, so a multiply-linked inode is refused on those paths. The extraction write sink was never given the same check. On published releases, nltk.pathsec.ZipFile.extract validates member names with validate_zip_archive and then...

Affected versions

PackageAffectedFixed in
nltk
PyPI
>= 3.9.4, < 3.10.43.10.4
Details and references

## Summary NLTK ships a security wrapper, `nltk.pathsec.ZipFile`, that is meant to confine archive extraction to trusted data roots and to block link-based escapes. When `nltk.download()` installs a package, the extraction write opens each member's target path without checking whether that path is a hardlink to a file located outside the data root. A local actor who can write inside a shared or predictable NLTK data root (for example `~/nltk_data`, a group-writable `/usr/share/nltk_data`, or a shared container volume) can pre-plant an in-root hardlink at a member path that a soon-to-be-installed package will write. When the victim later runs the download, extraction truncates and overwrites the outside-root target through that hardlink. This is the same weakness class as the previously fixed downloader hardlink issue, but the fix did not reach the package-extraction write sink, so the latest published release remains exploitable through this path. ## Root Cause The prior fix added an `st_nlink > 1` refusal to the file-open helpers (`nltk.pathsec.open` / `_hardened_open`) and routed the downloader temporary-file write through that hardened opener, so a multiply-linked inode is refused on those paths. The extraction write sink was never given the same check. On published releases, `nltk.pathsec.ZipFile.extract` validates member names with `validate_zip_archive` and then delegates to the standard library extractor, whose plain `open(targetpath, "wb")` opens and truncates a pre-existing hardlink. The containment guard `validate_zip_archive` relies on `Path.resolve()` and name checks; `resolve()` follows symlinks (so a symlinked member is correctly refused) but a hardlink has a legitimate in-root name and in-root resolved path, so it passes. No code on the extraction path performs the `st_nlink` fstat that the sibling open helper performs. ```text Affected component: nltk.pathsec (archive extraction), driven by nltk.downloader Released sink (<= 3.10.3): nltk/pathsec.py ZipFile.extract -> stdlib zipfile._extract_member -> open(targetpath, "wb") Containment guard that fails open for hardlinks: nltk/pathsec.py validate_zip_archive (name checks + Path.resolve()) Development-branch sink: nltk/pathsec.py ZipFile._extract_member leaf reopen with O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC|O_NOFOLLOW (no st_nlink fstat) ``` ## Impact An unprivileged local user who can create a file inside a data root that the victim's NLTK installation will extract into can cause the victim's process to truncate and overwrite a file outside that root. The attacker chooses which outside file is destroyed by selecting the hardlink target, so the integrity impact is complete for the chosen path (arbitrary outside-root file destruction). Where the victim resolves packages through an attacker-influenced mirror or index, the overwritten bytes are also attacker-chosen, which plausibly enables targeted file replacement and later code execution if the victim subsequently consumes the replaced file; that escalation is plausible rather than demonstrated here. Practical exploitation requires either that kernel hardlink protection (`fs.protected_hardlinks`) is disabled, or that the outside target is one the planting actor is permitted to hardlink (owned, writable, or group-shared), which is the same precondition carried by the previously accepted advisory for this weakness class. ## Proof of Concept `Dependencies: a released nltk (3.10.3) installed from PyPI. The demonstration creates a data root, a victim file outside it, and a package archive whose member path is pre-planted as a hardlink to the victim file, then extracts through the security wrapper. It runs as a single user and succeeds even with fs.protected_hardlinks=1.` Steps: 1. Register a data root with `nltk.data.path` and create an extraction subtree inside it. 2. Create a victim file outside the data root. 3. Pre-plant an in-root hardlink at the member path the archive will write. 4. Extract the archive through `nltk.pathsec

CVSS 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Severity from
GitHub (reviewed advisory)
Weakness
CWE-59, CWE-73
Also known as
CVE-2026-128135

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