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Severe, 6 weeks1496Projects326

1496 severe, 6 weeks · 326 projects

SurrealDBGHSA-wp87-mgvq-5j93

SurrealDB: USE NS/DB implicit creation bypasses DEFINE authorization

SurrealDB

CVE-2026-63741 · Published Jul 1, 2026 · updated Nov 4, 2026

Medium6.5
Fix: upgrade to 3.1.0 or later
GitHub advisory

An anonymous caller could create new namespaces and databases on a running SurrealDB instance without holding DEFINE NAMESPACE or DEFINE DATABASE permission.

USE NS <name> and USE DB <name> automatically create the target when it does not exist. The three places USE is handled , the RPC use method, Datastore::process_use, and the SurrealQL executor , did not check whether the caller was allowed to create the resource. Under default capabilities any session reached this path, including an unauthenticated guest.

Impact

What an attacker can do:

  • Create new namespaces and databases without DEFINE NAMESPACE / DEFINE DATABASE permission. An unauthenticated guest is enough under default capabilities.
  • Recreate a parent namespace that an operator deliberately dropped, using a stale namespace-Editor token, by running USE NS <dropped> DB anything.
  • Exhaust catalog storage by repeatedly creating new resources.

What it can't do:

  • Read or modify data inside any pre-existing namespace or database.
  • Escalate to root or namespace-owner privileges on existing resources.
  • Affect deployments running with auth_enabled=false.

Patches

All three USE entry points now check whether the caller has DEFINE NAMESPACE / DEFINE DATABASE authority before creating a missing target. Sessions still update their context regardless of authorization, so...

Affected versions

PackageAffectedFixed in
surrealdb
crates.io
< 3.1.03.1.0
Details and references

An anonymous caller could create new namespaces and databases on a running SurrealDB instance without holding `DEFINE NAMESPACE` or `DEFINE DATABASE` permission. `USE NS <name>` and `USE DB <name>` automatically create the target when it does not exist. The three places `USE` is handled , the RPC `use` method, `Datastore::process_use`, and the SurrealQL executor , did not check whether the caller was allowed to create the resource. Under default capabilities any session reached this path, including an unauthenticated guest. ### Impact What an attacker **can** do: - Create new namespaces and databases without `DEFINE NAMESPACE` / `DEFINE DATABASE` permission. An unauthenticated guest is enough under default capabilities. - Recreate a parent namespace that an operator deliberately dropped, using a stale namespace-Editor token, by running `USE NS <dropped> DB anything`. - Exhaust catalog storage by repeatedly creating new resources. What it **can't** do: - Read or modify data inside any pre-existing namespace or database. - Escalate to root or namespace-owner privileges on existing resources. - Affect deployments running with `auth_enabled=false`. ### Patches All three `USE` entry points now check whether the caller has `DEFINE NAMESPACE` / `DEFINE DATABASE` authority before creating a missing target. Sessions still update their context regardless of authorization, so SDKs that send `use` before `signin` continue to work , only the catalog creation step is gated. The parent-namespace side-effect path is closed by the same check. Versions 3.1.0 and later are not affected. ### Workarounds - Set `--deny-arbitrary-query *` for guest principals to remove the entry point. - Run with `--auth` and require all callers to `signin` before issuing `use`. - Revoke namespace-level tokens promptly when a namespace is dropped.

CVSS 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
Severity from
GitHub (reviewed advisory)
Weakness
CWE-862, CWE-863
Also known as
CVE-2026-63741

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