SurrealDB: Scraping a TABLE with no available PERMISSIONS to current auth level

A vulnerability was discovered where the user-supplied `WHERE` clause in a `SELECT` statement is evaluated against the full record data before `PERMISSIONS FOR SELECT WHERE` determines whether the principal is authorised to access that record. A side-effecting expression in the `WHERE` clause can exfiltrate record contents before the permission check runs. The same ordering bug affects the `SET`, `MERGE`, `CONTENT` and `PATCH` clauses of update-variant statements (`UPDATE`, `UPSERT-update`, `INSERT ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE`, `RELATE-update`). This vulnerability is confined to the attacker's current database. It does not cross namespace or database isolation boundaries. ### Impact An authenticated user , including Record and Scope users , can read the full contents of any table in the database they are authenticated against, bypassing `PERMISSIONS FOR SELECT WHERE` restrictions on those tables. The most direct exfiltration method requires scripting functions to be enabled (`--allow-scripting` / `-A`). However, exfiltration via SurrealQL's `THROW` statement is also feasible without scripting functions, and timing-based side-channel extraction is possible in all configurations. All tables within the attacker's current database, regardless of table-level `PERMISSIONS FOR SELECT WHERE` restrictions on those tables, are vulnerable to this attack. Tables in other databases within the same namespace, or within other namespaces, are not vulnerable. ### Patches A patch has been introduced that runs `check_permissions_table` before any user-supplied expression is evaluated against the record. A new `check_pre_update` helper centralises this ordering on every update-variant code path. Regression tests covering `WHERE`, `SET`, `MERGE`, `CONTENT`, `INSERT ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE`, and `RELATE` with `THROW` side-effects are included. - Versions 3.1.0 and later are not affected by this issue. ### Workarounds Affected users who are unable to update may want to: - **Disable scripting functions** if not required , remove the `-A` / `--allow-scripting` flag. This blocks the most direct exfiltration method but does not fully mitigate the vulnerability, as `THROW`-based and timing-based exfiltration remain possible. - **Limit query access** , restrict the ability of untrusted principals to run arbitrary `SELECT` queries with user-controlled `WHERE` clauses. - **Use namespace/database isolation** instead of table-level permissions as the primary security boundary where feasible, since the vulnerability is in table-level permission enforcement, not namespace or database isolation.

CVSS 3.1

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Severity from

GitHub (reviewed advisory)

Weakness

CWE-863

Also known as

CVE-2026-63755

• github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-98fx-66cf-fc7c
• nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63755
• github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/commit/500f4060349580b9cbb9c07b8112a487551c4616
• github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb
• www.vulncheck.com/advisories/surrealdb-before-permission-bypass-via-where-clause