Read-Only Open WebUI Users Can Modify Collaborative Documents via Socket.IO
Medium5.4CVE-2026-44564 · Published May 8, 2026 · updated Jul 13, 2026
Affected versions
| Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| open-webui PyPI | < 0.9.0 | 0.9.0 |
Details and references
# Read-Only Users Can Modify Collaborative Documents via Socket.IO ## Affected Component Socket.IO collaborative document editing handler: - `backend/open_webui/socket/main.py` (lines 667-721, `ydoc:document:update` handler) ## Affected Versions Current main branch and likely all versions with collaborative note editing. ## Description The `ydoc:document:update` Socket.IO event handler checks whether the sender is a member of the document's Socket.IO room (line 678) but does not verify that the sender has **write** permission. Users with read-only access join the document room via `ydoc:document:join`, which only requires `read` permission (line 520). Once in the room, the user can emit `ydoc:document:update` events that modify the in-memory Yjs document state and are broadcast to all other collaborators in real time. The `document_save_handler` (line 600) correctly checks `write` permission before persisting to the database, so the attacker cannot directly save changes. However, the tampered content is visible to all collaborators, and if any user with write access saves the document, the injected content is persisted. ```python # ydoc:document:update handler (line 667) , only checks room membership, not write permission async def on_document_update(sid, data): document_id = normalize_document_id(data.get('document_id', '')) # ... room = f'doc_{document_id}' if room not in sio.rooms(sid): # Room membership check only return # Applies update to Yjs state and broadcasts to all users YDOC_MANAGER.apply_update(document_id, update) await sio.emit('ydoc:document:update', {...}, room=room, skip_sid=sid) ``` Compare with `ydoc:document:join` (line 520) which checks permission: ```python # Only checks READ permission , so read-only users join the room if not has_access(user_id, type, id, 'read', db=db): return ``` ## CVSS 3.1 Breakdown | Metric | Value | Rationale | |--------|-------|-----------| | Attack Vector | Network (N) | Exploited remotely via Socket.IO events | | Attack Complexity | Low (L) | No special conditions; attacker emits a standard Socket.IO event | | Privileges Required | Low (L) | Requires a valid user account with read access to the shared note | | User Interaction | None (N) | Modifications appear in real time without victim action; however, persistence requires a write-access user to save | | Scope | Unchanged (U) | Impact is within the collaborative document context | | Confidentiality | None (N) | No data disclosure beyond what read access already provides | | Integrity | Low (L) | In-memory document state is modified and broadcast; persistence is indirect (requires another user to save) | | Availability | Low (L) | Collaborative editing session can be disrupted with invalid content | ## Attack Scenario 1. User A creates a note and shares it with User B with **read** permission. 2. User B opens the note, which triggers `ydoc:document:join` , the server checks read permission and adds User B to the document room. 3. User B emits `ydoc:document:update` with a crafted Yjs update payload via the Socket.IO connection (bypassing any frontend read-only enforcement). 4. The server applies the update to the Yjs document state and broadcasts it to all collaborators. 5. User A sees the injected content appear in their editor in real time. 6. If User A saves the document (intentionally or via autosave), the tampered content is persisted to the database , User A's save passes the write permission check since User A is the owner. ## Impact - Read-only users can inject, modify, or delete content in collaborative documents - Modifications are broadcast in real time to all collaborators, causing confusion or disruption - If a write-access user saves (including autosave), the tampered content is permanently persisted - Undermines the read/write permission model for collaborative editing ## Preconditions - Attacker must have a valid user account with read access to a
- CVSS 3.1
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
- Severity from
- GitHub (reviewed advisory)
- Weakness
- CWE-863
- Also known as
- CVE-2026-44564, PYSEC-2026-2762
More Open WebUI advisories
All Open WebUI| Date | Advisory | Severity | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| May 8 | open-webui Vulnerable to Stored XSS via Model Description CVE-2026-44721High7.3fixed in 0.9.0 | High7.3 | 0.9.0 |
| May 8 | Open WebUI has an LDAP Empty Password Authentication Bypass CVE-2026-44551Critical9.1fixed in 0.9.0 | Critical9.1 | 0.9.0 |
| May 8 | Open WebUI's Mass Assignment via Pydantic extra='allow' Allows Creating Folders in Other Users' Accounts CVE-2026-44550Medium5.0fixed in 0.9.0 | Medium5.0 | 0.9.0 |
| May 8 | Open WebUI: Stale Admin Role in Socket.IO Session Pool Enables Post-Demotion Cross-User Note Access CVE-2026-44553High8.1fixed in 0.9.0 | High8.1 | 0.9.0 |
| May 8 | Open WebUI: Redis Cache Keys tool_servers and terminal_servers Missing Instance Prefix Enable Cross-Instance Cache Poisoning CVE-2026-44552High8.7fixed in 0.9.0 | High8.7 | 0.9.0 |
| May 8 | Open WebUI's Base Model Routing Bypasses Access Control via Model Chaining CVE-2026-44555High7.6fixed in 0.9.0 | High7.6 | 0.9.0 |