AI and data stack advisories

Severe, 6 weeks1496Projects326

1496 severe, 6 weeks · 326 projects

Open WebUIGHSA-45m8-cpm2-3v65

Open WebUI: Stale Admin Role in Socket.IO Session Pool Enables Post-Demotion Cross-User Note Access

Open WebUI

CVE-2026-44553 · Published May 8, 2026 · updated Jul 13, 2026

High8.1
Fix: upgrade to 0.9.0 or later
GitHub advisory

Stale Admin Role in Socket.IO Session Pool Enables Post-Demotion Cross-User Note Access

Affected Component

Socket.IO session state and role-check callsites:

  • backend/open_webui/socket/main.py (lines 330-351, connect handler , role snapshotted into SESSION_POOL)
  • backend/open_webui/socket/main.py (lines 393-398, heartbeat handler , does not refresh role)
  • backend/open_webui/socket/main.py (line 538, ydoc:document:join , uses cached role for admin check)
  • backend/open_webui/socket/main.py (line 611, document_save_handler , uses cached role for admin check)
  • backend/open_webui/routers/users.py (lines 557-633, role update , does not invalidate SESSION_POOL)
  • backend/open_webui/routers/users.py (line 641, user delete , does not invalidate SESSION_POOL)

Affected Versions

Current main branch (commit 6fdd19bf1) and likely all versions with the collaborative document (Yjs) Socket.IO handlers.

Description

When a user connects via Socket.IO, the connect handler authenticates them via JWT and stores their user record (including role) in the in-memory SESSION_POOL dictionary keyed by session ID. The heartbeat handler keeps the session alive indefinitely but only refreshes the last_seen_at timestamp , never the role.

Role checks in the Yjs collaborative document handlers (ydoc:document:join, document_save_handler) consult...

Affected versions

PackageAffectedFixed in
open-webui
PyPI
< 0.9.00.9.0
Details and references

# Stale Admin Role in Socket.IO Session Pool Enables Post-Demotion Cross-User Note Access ## Affected Component Socket.IO session state and role-check callsites: - `backend/open_webui/socket/main.py` (lines 330-351, `connect` handler , role snapshotted into SESSION_POOL) - `backend/open_webui/socket/main.py` (lines 393-398, `heartbeat` handler , does not refresh role) - `backend/open_webui/socket/main.py` (line 538, `ydoc:document:join` , uses cached role for admin check) - `backend/open_webui/socket/main.py` (line 611, `document_save_handler` , uses cached role for admin check) - `backend/open_webui/routers/users.py` (lines 557-633, role update , does not invalidate SESSION_POOL) - `backend/open_webui/routers/users.py` (line 641, user delete , does not invalidate SESSION_POOL) ## Affected Versions Current main branch (commit `6fdd19bf1`) and likely all versions with the collaborative document (Yjs) Socket.IO handlers. ## Description When a user connects via Socket.IO, the `connect` handler authenticates them via JWT and stores their user record (including `role`) in the in-memory `SESSION_POOL` dictionary keyed by session ID. The `heartbeat` handler keeps the session alive indefinitely but only refreshes the `last_seen_at` timestamp , never the role. Role checks in the Yjs collaborative document handlers (`ydoc:document:join`, `document_save_handler`) consult the cached `SESSION_POOL` role rather than the database. Meanwhile, administrative role changes and user deletions do not iterate `SESSION_POOL` to disconnect affected sessions. As a result, a user whose admin role has been revoked retains admin privileges within their existing Socket.IO session for as long as they keep the connection alive (via automatic heartbeats). HTTP endpoints are not affected , `get_current_user` at [utils/auth.py](backend/open_webui/utils/auth.py) refetches the user record from the database on every request. The gap is exclusive to the Socket.IO session cache. ```python # socket/main.py:330-351 , role snapshotted at connect time async def connect(sid, environ, auth): user = None if auth and 'token' in auth: data = decode_token(auth['token']) if data is not None and 'id' in data: user = Users.get_user_by_id(data['id']) if user: SESSION_POOL[sid] = { 'id': user.id, 'role': user.role, # ← snapshotted, never refreshed ... } # socket/main.py:393-398 , heartbeat refreshes last_seen_at only async def heartbeat(sid, data): user = SESSION_POOL.get(sid) if user: SESSION_POOL[sid] = {**user, 'last_seen_at': int(time.time())} # role is carried forward unchanged # socket/main.py:538 , admin check against cached role if user.get('role') != 'admin' and not has_access(user_id, 'note', note_id, 'read', db=db): return ``` ## Attack Scenario 1. User B is an admin and has an active browser session with a live Socket.IO connection. `SESSION_POOL[sid]` records `role='admin'`. 2. Admin A demotes User B to a regular user via `POST /api/v1/users/{B_id}/update`. The DB `user.role` becomes `'user'`. 3. No Socket.IO disconnect, no SESSION_POOL update, no token revocation event is triggered by the role change. 4. User B's client continues sending `heartbeat` events every few seconds; these are accepted and only refresh `last_seen_at`. 5. User B emits `ydoc:document:join` with `document_id = 'note:<victim_note_id>'` for any note they do not own. 6. The handler at line 538 evaluates `user.get('role') != 'admin'` , returns `False` because `SESSION_POOL` still holds the stale `admin` role. Access check is bypassed, User B joins the document room, receives full document state and live updates. 7. User B emits `ydoc:document:update` for the same note. The handler at line 611 performs the same cached-admin check, bypasses authorization, and persists attacker-controlled content to the victim's note via `Notes.updat

CVSS 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Severity from
GitHub (reviewed advisory)
Weakness
CWE-384, CWE-613, CWE-863
Also known as
CVE-2026-44553, PYSEC-2026-2697

More Open WebUI advisories

All Open WebUI