Skip to content
Open WebUIGHSA-rjmp-vjf2-qf4g

Open WebUI: spoofing

Medium5.4CVE-2026-45396 · Published May 14, 2026 · updated Jul 13, 2026

# Mass Assignment in Feedback Creation Allows User ID Spoofing and Evaluation Data Manipulation ## Summary The `POST /api/v1/evaluations/feedback` endpoint in Open WebUI v0.9.2 is vulnerable to mass assignment via `FeedbackForm`, which uses `model_config = ConfigDict(extra='allow')`. Due to an insecure dictionary merge order in `insert_new_feedback()`, an authenticated attacker can inject a `user_id` field in the request body that overwrites the server-derived value, creating feedback records attributed to any arbitrary user. This corrupts the model evaluation leaderboard (Elo ratings) and enables identity spoofing. ## Details The vulnerability exists in two layers: ### 1. Model Layer , Insecure Dict Merge Order **File:** `backend/open_webui/models/feedbacks.py`, lines 148–160 ```python async def insert_new_feedback( self, user_id: str, form_data: FeedbackForm, db: Optional[AsyncSession] = None ) -> Optional[FeedbackModel]: async with get_async_db_context(db) as db: id = str(uuid.uuid4()) feedback = FeedbackModel( **{ 'id': id, 'user_id': user_id, # ← Server-set from auth token 'versio...

GitHub advisory

Affected versions

PackageAffectedFixed in
open-webui
PyPI
< 0.9.50.9.5
Details and references

# Mass Assignment in Feedback Creation Allows User ID Spoofing and Evaluation Data Manipulation ## Summary The `POST /api/v1/evaluations/feedback` endpoint in Open WebUI v0.9.2 is vulnerable to mass assignment via `FeedbackForm`, which uses `model_config = ConfigDict(extra='allow')`. Due to an insecure dictionary merge order in `insert_new_feedback()`, an authenticated attacker can inject a `user_id` field in the request body that overwrites the server-derived value, creating feedback records attributed to any arbitrary user. This corrupts the model evaluation leaderboard (Elo ratings) and enables identity spoofing. ## Details The vulnerability exists in two layers: ### 1. Model Layer , Insecure Dict Merge Order **File:** `backend/open_webui/models/feedbacks.py`, lines 148–160 ```python async def insert_new_feedback( self, user_id: str, form_data: FeedbackForm, db: Optional[AsyncSession] = None ) -> Optional[FeedbackModel]: async with get_async_db_context(db) as db: id = str(uuid.uuid4()) feedback = FeedbackModel( **{ 'id': id, 'user_id': user_id, # ← Server-set from auth token 'version': 0, **form_data.model_dump(), # ← OVERWRITES 'id', 'user_id', 'version' 'created_at': int(time.time()), 'updated_at': int(time.time()), } ) ``` In Python, when a dictionary literal contains duplicate keys, the **last value wins**. Since `**form_data.model_dump()` appears after `'user_id': user_id`, any `user_id` field in the form data overwrites the authenticated user's ID. ### 2. Schema Layer , `extra='allow'` on Request Form **File:** `backend/open_webui/models/feedbacks.py`, line 106 ```python class FeedbackForm(BaseModel): type: str data: Optional[RatingData] = None meta: Optional[dict] = None snapshot: Optional[SnapshotData] = None model_config = ConfigDict(extra='allow') # ← Accepts arbitrary extra fields ``` The `extra='allow'` config means Pydantic will accept and preserve any extra fields in the request body, including `user_id`, `id`, and `version`. These are then spread into the `FeedbackModel` constructor, overwriting server-set values. ### Contrast with Secure Pattern Other models in the same codebase use the correct ordering. For example, `backend/open_webui/models/functions.py`, line 120: ```python function = FunctionModel(**{ **form_data.model_dump(), # ← Spread FIRST 'user_id': user_id, # ← Server value AFTER → always wins }) ``` And `ModelForm` at `backend/open_webui/models/models.py` uses `extra='ignore'`, which is the strictest approach. ## Impact ### 1. User Identity Spoofing An attacker can create feedback records attributed to any user by specifying their `user_id`. The admin export endpoint (`GET /api/v1/evaluations/feedbacks/export`) and admin list (`GET /api/v1/evaluations/feedbacks/all`) will show the spoofed `user_id` as the feedback author. ### 2. Model Evaluation Leaderboard Manipulation The Elo rating system at `backend/open_webui/routers/evaluations.py` computes model rankings directly from feedback records. An attacker can inject fake rating feedback to: - Artificially inflate ratings for a specific model - Deflate ratings for competitor models - Make organizational model evaluation decisions unreliable ### 3. Record ID Control By injecting a custom `id`, an attacker controls the UUID of the feedback record. While this won't overwrite existing records (primary key constraint), it enables predictable record IDs that could be useful in other attack chains. ## PoC ```python import requests BASE_URL = "http://localhost:8080" # 1. Login as attacker session = requests.Session() login_resp = session.post(f"{BASE_URL}/api/v1/auths/signin", json={ "email": "attacker@example.com", "password": "attackerpass" }) token = login_resp.json()["token"] headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"} #

CVSS 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
Severity from
GitHub (reviewed advisory)
Weakness
CWE-915
Also known as
CVE-2026-45396, PYSEC-2026-2756

More Open WebUI advisories

All Open WebUI

Critical advisories by email

Wednesdays: the week’s critical and high advisories in the AI and data stack, with the fixed versions. Only in weeks that have some.

Double opt-in. Unsubscribe any time.