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SurrealDBGHSA-6vg3-hgrw-p5gf

SurrealDB has an Authorization Bypass via Composite Record-id Paths

Medium5.4Published Jul 1, 2026

An authenticated user could bypass permission rules that gated access on parts of a record's id , most commonly tenant-isolation rules of the form `PERMISSIONS FOR select WHERE id.tenant = $auth.id.tenant`. The same defect also let UNIQUE constraints defined on parts of an id admit duplicate entries. When a query referenced part of a composite record id (`id.tenant`, `id.uid`, …), SurrealDB read the value from the record's editable body fields instead of from the immutable id key. Because the body is editable but the id is fixed at creation, an attacker with write access could set the body field to any value and have permission checks read that spoofed value. ### Impact What an attacker **can** do: - Read records hidden by permission rules of the form `id.<field> = $auth.<...>` (typically tenant- or scope-isolation boundaries) by writing the same-named field on a record they control to the spoofed value. - Cause UNIQUE constraints defined on `id.<field>` to silently admit duplicate entries, leaving the database with rows that violate the constraint. What it **can't** do: - Cross namespace or database isolation boundaries. -Bypass field-level `PERMISSIONS FOR` update clauses ...

GitHub advisory

Affected versions

PackageAffectedFixed in
surrealdb
crates.io
< 3.1.03.1.0
Details and references

An authenticated user could bypass permission rules that gated access on parts of a record's id , most commonly tenant-isolation rules of the form `PERMISSIONS FOR select WHERE id.tenant = $auth.id.tenant`. The same defect also let UNIQUE constraints defined on parts of an id admit duplicate entries. When a query referenced part of a composite record id (`id.tenant`, `id.uid`, …), SurrealDB read the value from the record's editable body fields instead of from the immutable id key. Because the body is editable but the id is fixed at creation, an attacker with write access could set the body field to any value and have permission checks read that spoofed value. ### Impact What an attacker **can** do: - Read records hidden by permission rules of the form `id.<field> = $auth.<...>` (typically tenant- or scope-isolation boundaries) by writing the same-named field on a record they control to the spoofed value. - Cause UNIQUE constraints defined on `id.<field>` to silently admit duplicate entries, leaving the database with rows that violate the constraint. What it **can't** do: - Cross namespace or database isolation boundaries. -Bypass field-level `PERMISSIONS FOR` update clauses that don't reference `id.<field>` paths. - Affect availability or crash the server. ### Patches The value-path resolver now special-cases `Part::Field` and `Part::Value` against `RecordIdKey::Object`, reading the named component directly from the id key without ever entering `select_document`. The Array-keyed special case (`id[0]`, `id[1]`, …) is unchanged. - Versions 3.1.0 and later are not affected. ### Workarounds Users unable to patch are advised to consider the following workarounds: - Avoid permission expressions that read `id.<field>` on Object-keyed record ids; gate on the full record id (`id = $auth.id`) or on a server-derived session value instead. - Avoid UNIQUE indexes on `id.<field>` until 3.1.0; use `DEFINE INDEX ... ON FIELDS id UNIQUE` (the full id) where possible.

CVSS 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Severity from
GitHub (reviewed advisory)
Weakness
CWE-639, CWE-863

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