AI and data stack advisories

Severe, 6 weeks1496Projects326

1496 severe, 6 weeks · 326 projects

vLLMGHSA-5jv2-g5wq-cmr4

vLLM: GGUF dequantize kernel int truncation exposes uninitialized GPU memory in multi-tenant serving

vLLM

CVE-2026-53923 · Published Jun 17, 2026 · updated Sep 10, 2026

Medium7.5
Fix: upgrade to 0.24.0 or later
GitHub advisory

Summary

Integer truncation of tensor dimensions in vLLM's GGUF dequantize kernels (csrc/quantization/gguf/gguf_kernel.cu) causes partial tensor processing. The output tensor is allocated at full size via torch::empty (uninitialized memory), but the dequantize CUDA kernel processes only a truncated number of elements. The unfilled portion of the output tensor retains whatever was previously in GPU memory. In multi-tenant inference deployments, this residual GPU memory may contain tensor data from other users' inference requests, constituting information disclosure.

Root Cause

The to_cuda_ggml_t function pointer type at ggml-common.h:1067 declares its element count parameter as int (32-bit):

```cpp

using to_cuda_ggml_t = void (*)(const void * __restrict__ x,

dst_t * __restrict__ y,

int k, // 32-bit

cudaStream_t stream);

`

All dequantize kernel functions (dequantize_block_cuda, dequantize_row_q2_K_cuda, etc. in dequantize.cuh) inherit this int k parameter and use it as the kernel launch grid size:

```cpp

static void dequantize_block_cuda(..., const int k, cudaStream_t stream) {

const int num_blocks = (k + 2*CUDA_DEQUANTIZE_BLOCK_SIZE - 1) / (2*CUDA_DEQUANTIZE_BLOCK_SIZE);

dequantize_block<<<num_blocks, CUDA_DEQUANTIZE_BLOCK_SIZE, 0,...

Affected versions

PackageAffectedFixed in
vllm
PyPI
>= 0.5.5, < 0.24.00.24.0
Details and references

## Summary Integer truncation of tensor dimensions in vLLM's GGUF dequantize kernels (`csrc/quantization/gguf/gguf_kernel.cu`) causes partial tensor processing. The output tensor is allocated at full size via `torch::empty` (uninitialized memory), but the dequantize CUDA kernel processes only a truncated number of elements. The unfilled portion of the output tensor retains whatever was previously in GPU memory. In multi-tenant inference deployments, this residual GPU memory may contain tensor data from other users' inference requests, constituting information disclosure. ## Root Cause The `to_cuda_ggml_t` function pointer type at `ggml-common.h:1067` declares its element count parameter as `int` (32-bit): ```cpp using to_cuda_ggml_t = void (*)(const void * __restrict__ x, dst_t * __restrict__ y, int k, // 32-bit cudaStream_t stream); ``` All dequantize kernel functions (`dequantize_block_cuda`, `dequantize_row_q2_K_cuda`, etc. in `dequantize.cuh`) inherit this `int k` parameter and use it as the kernel launch grid size: ```cpp static void dequantize_block_cuda(..., const int k, cudaStream_t stream) { const int num_blocks = (k + 2*CUDA_DEQUANTIZE_BLOCK_SIZE - 1) / (2*CUDA_DEQUANTIZE_BLOCK_SIZE); dequantize_block<<<num_blocks, CUDA_DEQUANTIZE_BLOCK_SIZE, 0, stream>>>(vx, y, k); } ``` In `ggml_dequantize()` at `gguf_kernel.cu:85`, the caller passes `m * n` (an `int64_t` product) to this `int k` parameter: ```cpp at::Tensor DW = torch::empty({m, n}, options); // line 80: full-size, UNINITIALIZED // ... to_cuda((void*)W.data_ptr(), (scalar_t*)DW.data_ptr(), m * n, stream); // line 85: m*n truncated to int ``` When `m * n > INT_MAX`, the truncated `k` is smaller than the actual tensor size. The kernel processes `k` elements. The remaining `(m * n) - k` elements in `DW` are never written and contain stale GPU memory. This is a single root cause -- the `int` type on the `k` parameter in `to_cuda_ggml_t` -- with a single fix: change `int k` to `int64_t k`. All dequantize functions inherit this type through the same typedef. ## Affected Functions All in `csrc/quantization/gguf/gguf_kernel.cu`: | Function | Line | Allocation | Info Disclosure? | |----------|------|-----------|-----------------| | `ggml_dequantize` | 74 | `torch::empty({m, n})` at line 80 | Yes -- `m*n` truncated to `int k` at line 85 | | `ggml_mul_mat_vec_a8` | 91 | `torch::empty({vecs, row})` at line 99 | Yes -- `int col = X.sizes()[1]` at line 94 | | `ggml_mul_mat_a8` | 207 | `torch::empty({batch, row})` at line 215 | Yes -- `int col = X.sizes()[1]` at line 210 | | `ggml_moe_a8` | 279 | `torch::empty({tokens*top_k, row})` at line 289 | Yes -- `int col = X.sizes()[1]` at line 285 | All four functions allocate output tensors with `torch::empty` (uninitialized) and then run CUDA kernels that use truncated dimension values as loop bounds. The unfilled portion of each output tensor retains stale GPU memory. `ggml_moe_a8_vec` (line 382) uses `torch::zeros` instead of `torch::empty`, so it is not affected by the info disclosure variant. ## Impact: Information Disclosure in Multi-Tenant Serving vLLM is designed for multi-tenant inference serving. GPU memory is reused across requests from different users. When the dequantize kernel partially fills an output tensor: 1. The output tensor `DW` is allocated with `torch::empty` -- the buffer contains whatever was previously in that GPU memory region 2. The dequantize kernel fills only a truncated portion of the buffer 3. The unfilled portion retains residual data from prior GPU operations, which may include tensor data from other users' inference requests 4. The contaminated tensor proceeds through the model computation 5. No error or warning is generated -- the partial fill is silent This is a confidentiality violation. In shared inference deployments (the primary vLLM use case), one user's inf

CVSS 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Severity from
GitHub (reviewed advisory)
Weakness
CWE-200, CWE-681
Also known as
CVE-2026-53923, PYSEC-2026-3403

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