Skip to content
GitHubGHSA-x78f-wrrj-4h24

gh-aw: HTTPS egress allowlist bypass via TLS SNI domain fronting

High8.3Published Sep 23, 2026

## Summary GitHub Agentic Workflows generated workflows using `gh-aw-firewall` versions that authorized HTTPS tunnels from the plaintext HTTP `CONNECT` destination without verifying that the TLS ClientHello SNI matched the workflow's domain allowlist. An attacker could connect to an allowlisted shared CDN hostname and then request a different, non-allowlisted hostname inside the TLS tunnel. ## Impact An untrusted or prompt-injected agent running in a generated workflow could bypass HTTPS egress restrictions and communicate with non-allowlisted destinations. This could enable unauthorized outbound communication or data exfiltration from the workflow environment. The bypass affects the default HTTPS filtering path. Trusted AWF-owned sidecars and explicitly allowlisted IP destinations retain their separately scoped behavior. Full SSL Bump content-inspection mode is unchanged. ## Remediation The firewall fix inspects the TLS ClientHello without decrypting application traffic. Connections with missing, blocked, or non-allowlisted SNI are terminated; allowlisted connections are spliced unchanged. Blocked-domain rules take precedence over parent-domain allow rules. Upgrade `gh-aw` ...

GitHub advisory

Affected versions

PackageAffectedFixed in
github/gh-aw
Product
< 0.89.170.89.17
Details and references

## Summary GitHub Agentic Workflows generated workflows using `gh-aw-firewall` versions that authorized HTTPS tunnels from the plaintext HTTP `CONNECT` destination without verifying that the TLS ClientHello SNI matched the workflow's domain allowlist. An attacker could connect to an allowlisted shared CDN hostname and then request a different, non-allowlisted hostname inside the TLS tunnel. ## Impact An untrusted or prompt-injected agent running in a generated workflow could bypass HTTPS egress restrictions and communicate with non-allowlisted destinations. This could enable unauthorized outbound communication or data exfiltration from the workflow environment. The bypass affects the default HTTPS filtering path. Trusted AWF-owned sidecars and explicitly allowlisted IP destinations retain their separately scoped behavior. Full SSL Bump content-inspection mode is unchanged. ## Remediation The firewall fix inspects the TLS ClientHello without decrypting application traffic. Connections with missing, blocked, or non-allowlisted SNI are terminated; allowlisted connections are spliced unchanged. Blocked-domain rules take precedence over parent-domain allow rules. Upgrade `gh-aw` to the first release that includes a fixed `gh-aw-firewall` version. Recompile and redeploy existing generated workflows after upgrading; upgrading the compiler alone does not replace firewall versions already pinned in generated workflow lock files. At the time this advisory was drafted, no fixed `gh-aw` release had been published. ## Workarounds No workaround is currently documented. ## References - https://github.com/github/gh-aw-firewall/pull/8878 - https://github.com/github/gh-aw-firewall/commit/7c56dd97cc9938086b2ecf0c61a7344af1ec0dea - https://github.com/github/gh-aw-firewall/security/advisories/GHSA-w6qx-pgrq-2c28

CVSS 4.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
Severity from
GitHub (reviewed advisory)

More GitHub advisories

All GitHub
Advisory
GitHub Enterprise Server: cross-site scripting
High7.4Sep 22
GitHub Enterprise Server: server-side request forgery
Critical9.3Sep 22
GitHub Enterprise Server: insecure direct object reference
Medium6.0Sep 22
GitHub Enterprise Server: server-side request forgery
High7.7Sep 1
GitHub Enterprise Server: race condition
High7.7Sep 1
GitHub Enterprise Server: server-side request forgery
High8.2Sep 1

Critical advisories by email

Wednesdays: the week’s critical and high advisories in the AI and data stack, with the fixed versions. Only in weeks that have some.

Double opt-in. Unsubscribe any time.