AI and data stack advisories

Severe, 6 weeks2431Projects328

2431 severe, 6 weeks · 328 projects

doclingGHSA-q43m-vhcp-mhvm

Docling: `enable_local_fetch` is not enforced in HTML browser-rendering mode

docling

CVE-2026-105750 · Published Oct 6, 2026 · updated Oct 15, 2026

Medium5.9
Fix: upgrade to 2.118.1 or later
GitHub advisory

Summary

When the HTML backend renders pages in a headless browser (HTMLBackendOptions(render_page=True)), the enable_local_fetch option is not enforced. A crafted HTML file can embed an arbitrary local file (for example with <iframe src="file:///...">), and that file's contents appear in the page image attached to the returned DoclingDocument.

Details

In render mode, Playwright requests are filtered by HTMLDocumentBackend._get_browser_request_block_reason. In affected versions, this check allowed file: URLs unconditionally, before reading any option. As a result:

  • enable_local_fetch=False did not block local file access, and
  • even with enable_local_fetch=True, file access was not limited to the source document's directory, unlike the non-render path (ImageResourceLoader), which rejects absolute paths and path traversal.

Versions 2.82.0–2.90.x did no request filtering in render mode at all.

The browser runs with JavaScript disabled (from 2.91.0), so disclosure is passive: only what Chromium renders visibly inside the page viewport ends up in the page image.

Only Path inputs are affected. They are loaded through a file:// URL. Stream inputs are loaded with page.set_content() into an opaque origin, from which Chromium does not load file:// subresources.

Impact

An attacker who can submit HTML for conversion can read any text file...

Affected versions

PackageAffectedFixed in
docling
PyPI
>= 2.82.0, < 2.118.12.118.1
Details and references

### Summary When the HTML backend renders pages in a headless browser (`HTMLBackendOptions(render_page=True)`), the `enable_local_fetch` option is not enforced. A crafted HTML file can embed an arbitrary local file (for example with `<iframe src="file:///...">`), and that file's contents appear in the page image attached to the returned `DoclingDocument`. ### Details In render mode, Playwright requests are filtered by `HTMLDocumentBackend._get_browser_request_block_reason`. In affected versions, this check allowed `file:` URLs unconditionally, before reading any option. As a result: - `enable_local_fetch=False` did not block local file access, and - even with `enable_local_fetch=True`, file access was not limited to the source document's directory, unlike the non-render path (`ImageResourceLoader`), which rejects absolute paths and path traversal. Versions 2.82.0–2.90.x did no request filtering in render mode at all. The browser runs with JavaScript disabled (from 2.91.0), so disclosure is passive: only what Chromium renders visibly inside the page viewport ends up in the page image. Only `Path` inputs are affected. They are loaded through a `file://` URL. Stream inputs are loaded with `page.set_content()` into an opaque origin, from which Chromium does not load `file://` subresources. ### Impact An attacker who can submit HTML for conversion can read any text file the conversion process can read (for example `.env` files, credential files, or other users' documents on a shared host) by having it rendered into the page image. Only applications that meet **all** of these conditions are affected: - they set `HTMLBackendOptions(render_page=True)` in Python, - they have the optional `playwright` dependency installed, and - they pass untrusted HTML as a filesystem `Path`. The following are **not** affected: the default configuration (`render_page=False`), the `docling` CLI, `docling-serve`, and the EPUB, Markdown, XBRL and email backends. ### Patches Fixed in **2.118.1** (#3948). In render mode, `file:` requests are now blocked unless `enable_local_fetch=True`, and allowed requests are limited to the source document's directory. ### Workarounds If you can't upgrade, don't use `render_page=True` on untrusted HTML, or pass the input as a stream instead of a `Path`. ### Credits Reported by @priyankn.

CVSS 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Severity from
GitHub (reviewed advisory)
Weakness
CWE-552, CWE-863
Also known as
CVE-2026-105750, PYSEC-2026-4196, PYSEC-2026-4215

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