Flowise: improper authorization
HighCVE-2026-69262 · Published Aug 4, 2026
# summary: In Flowise, `DELETE /api/v1/chatflows/:id` authorizes requests with `checkAnyPermission('chatflows:delete,agentflows:delete')`. Possession of either permission is sufficient to reach the delete path. The delete logic does not validate the target resource `type`, allowing a caller with only `agentflows:delete` to delete a `CHATFLOW`, and a caller with only `chatflows:delete` to delete an `AGENTFLOW`. # details: The delete route accepts either `chatflows:delete` or `agentflows:delete`. The subsequent logic only resolves the target record by `id` and `workspaceId`, then deletes by `id` without checking whether the target resource type matches the granted permission domain. As a result, there is no binding between permission scope and flow type: - `agentflows:delete` can be used to delete `CHATFLOW` - `chatflows:delete` can be used to delete `AGENTFLOW` This breaks the intended RBAC separation between Chatflows and Agentflows. # impact: Users authorized to manage only one flow type can delete the other flow type within the same workspace, resulting in unauthorized deletion and configuration loss. # reproduction steps: 1. Log in as a user who can create API keys. 2. Cr...
Affected versions
| Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| flowise npm | < 3.1.3 | 3.1.3 |
Details and references
# summary: In Flowise, `DELETE /api/v1/chatflows/:id` authorizes requests with `checkAnyPermission('chatflows:delete,agentflows:delete')`. Possession of either permission is sufficient to reach the delete path. The delete logic does not validate the target resource `type`, allowing a caller with only `agentflows:delete` to delete a `CHATFLOW`, and a caller with only `chatflows:delete` to delete an `AGENTFLOW`. # details: The delete route accepts either `chatflows:delete` or `agentflows:delete`. The subsequent logic only resolves the target record by `id` and `workspaceId`, then deletes by `id` without checking whether the target resource type matches the granted permission domain. As a result, there is no binding between permission scope and flow type: - `agentflows:delete` can be used to delete `CHATFLOW` - `chatflows:delete` can be used to delete `AGENTFLOW` This breaks the intended RBAC separation between Chatflows and Agentflows. # impact: Users authorized to manage only one flow type can delete the other flow type within the same workspace, resulting in unauthorized deletion and configuration loss. # reproduction steps: 1. Log in as a user who can create API keys. 2. Create a normal `CHATFLOW` and record its `id`. 3. Create an API key with only `agentflows:delete`. 4. Use that API key to send: ```bash curl -i -X DELETE \ -H 'Authorization: Bearer <agentflows_delete_only_key>' \ http://localhost:8080/api/v1/chatflows/<chatflow_id> ``` 5. Observe a `200 OK` response, for example: ```json {"raw":[],"affected":1} ``` 6. Read the same `id` again and observe `404 Not Found`.
- CVSS 4.0
- CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Severity from
- GitHub (reviewed advisory)
- Weakness
- CWE-863
- Also known as
- CVE-2026-69262
More Flowise advisories
All Flowise| Date | Advisory | Severity | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 4 | Flowise: information disclosure CriticalAug 4 | Critical | 3.1.3 |
| Aug 4 | Flowise: CSV Agent Prompt Injection Remote Code Execution VulnerabilityCriticalAug 4 | Critical | 3.1.3 |
| Aug 4 | Flowise: Broken Access Control in Stripe Subscription Endpoints Allows Cross-Tenant Billing ManipulationHighAug 4 | High | 3.1.3 |
| Aug 4 | Flowise: missing authorizationMediumAug 4 | Medium | 3.1.4 |
| Aug 4 | Flowise: Missing Authorization on Execution Update EndpointHighAug 4 | High | 3.1.3 |
| Aug 4 | Flowise: Cross-Workspace OAuth2 Credential Metadata LeakHighAug 4 | High | 3.1.3 |