AI and data stack advisories

Severe, 6 weeks1496Projects326

1496 severe, 6 weeks · 326 projects

LightRAGGHSA-hrmj-7rvj-4hg8

lightrag-hku: Sensitive Information Exposure Through Raw Exception Messages in API Error Responses

LightRAG

CVE-2026-85709 · Published Sep 22, 2026 · updated Oct 1, 2026

Medium5.3
Fix: upgrade to 1.5.5 or later
GitHub advisory

Summary

The LightRAG API server passes raw Python exception messages directly into HTTP

error responses across 30+ error handlers in every router. When combined with

the default unauthenticated configuration (see companion report on CWE-306), any

network-reachable client can trigger exceptions whose raw text discloses

internal infrastructure , server filesystem paths, database host/port/user, LLM

provider error details, and Python library internals. No global exception

handler sanitizes error messages before they reach the client.

Details

Throughout the API route handlers, exceptions are caught and their string

representation is returned verbatim via detail=str(e) / detail=str(exc)

(and f-string variants such as detail=f"...: {str(e)}"). This occurs in every

router file. Location breakdown on the current main branch:

**HTTP 500 , raw exception passthrough (except Exception as e):**

  • document_routes.py , 13
  • graph_routes.py , 12 (mix of detail=f"...{str(e)}" and detail=error_msg)
  • query_routes.py , 3
  • ollama_api.py , 2
  • lightrag_server.py , 1 (health endpoint)

**HTTP 422 , raw exception passthrough (except ValueError as exc):**

  • document_routes.py , 2 (chunking-config validation)

Total: ~33 raw-exception-to-HTTP-response locations. The only pre-existing

custom exception handler in lightrag_server.py is specific to...

Affected versions

PackageAffectedFixed in
lightrag-hku
PyPI
< 1.5.51.5.5
Details and references

### Summary The LightRAG API server passes raw Python exception messages directly into HTTP error responses across 30+ error handlers in every router. When combined with the default unauthenticated configuration (see companion report on CWE-306), any network-reachable client can trigger exceptions whose raw text discloses internal infrastructure , server filesystem paths, database host/port/user, LLM provider error details, and Python library internals. No global exception handler sanitizes error messages before they reach the client. ### Details Throughout the API route handlers, exceptions are caught and their string representation is returned verbatim via `detail=str(e)` / `detail=str(exc)` (and f-string variants such as `detail=f"...: {str(e)}"`). This occurs in every router file. Location breakdown on the current `main` branch: **HTTP 500 , raw exception passthrough (`except Exception as e`):** - `document_routes.py` , 13 - `graph_routes.py` , 12 (mix of `detail=f"...{str(e)}"` and `detail=error_msg`) - `query_routes.py` , 3 - `ollama_api.py` , 2 - `lightrag_server.py` , 1 (health endpoint) **HTTP 422 , raw exception passthrough (`except ValueError as exc`):** - `document_routes.py` , 2 (chunking-config validation) **Total: ~33 raw-exception-to-HTTP-response locations.** The only pre-existing custom exception handler in `lightrag_server.py` is specific to `RequestValidationError` for `/query/data`; it does not cover the generic `Exception` handlers in route code. Example pattern (`document_routes.py`, upload handler): ```python except Exception as e: logger.error(f"Error /documents/upload: {file.filename}: {str(e)}") raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=str(e)) ``` **Categories of sensitive information that can leak through these responses:** 1. **Server filesystem paths.** File-I/O errors from the default JSON storage backend expose the server's directory layout (e.g. `[Errno 13] Permission denied: '/app/data/rag_storage/default/kv_store_full_docs.json'`), aiding path-traversal or targeted attacks. *(Verified , see PoC Step 1.)* 2. **Database host / port / user / database name.** Connection errors from the PostgreSQL, MongoDB, Redis, or Neo4j backends surface the target the driver was trying to reach , e.g. asyncpg raises `password authentication failed for user "lightrag"` (username) or a socket error naming the unreachable host and port. **Note on credentials:** the PostgreSQL backend uses `asyncpg`, which is built from keyword parameters and does **not** echo the password in its exception strings , so a raw asyncpg error leaks host/port/user/db, not the password. URI-configured backends behave differently: the MongoDB backend is built with `AsyncMongoClient(MONGO_URI, ...)`, and a malformed-URI / configuration error from pymongo can surface the connection string itself, which may embed credentials (`mongodb://user:password@host:port/`). The leak surface is therefore backend- and error-type-dependent. 3. **LLM provider error details.** Errors from OpenAI / Gemini / Bedrock and other providers may include model names, organization ids, or partial API error context that reveal the deployment. 4. **Python library internals.** Unexpected exceptions expose class names, library-internal messages, and stack fragments that fingerprint the server stack and version. 5. **Configuration details.** Errors during configuration/parsing may reveal storage backend types and other configuration values. The risk is amplified by the default unauthenticated configuration (CWE-306, companion report), which lets any network client trigger and read these errors without credentials. ### PoC Tested on a clean checkout with the `[api]` extras installed and the server run via `lightrag-server`. #### Step 1 , Filesystem path disclosure (default JSON storage) With the default storage backend, a file-permission error is returned verbatim: ```b

CVSS 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Severity from
GitHub (reviewed advisory)
Weakness
CWE-209
Also known as
CVE-2026-85709, PYSEC-2026-4063

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