Two regexes in backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py that parse <$skillId|label> skill-mention tags backtrack in O(n²) on input that contains <$ followed by a long run with no closing >. Both run synchronously, on the asyncio event loop, on every chat completion with no feature gate. Because the default deployment is a single uvicorn worker, one such input pins a CPU core inside re and freezes the entire instance for all users until the worker is killed. Any authenticated user can trigger it with one chat message; it also fires accidentally on benign retrieved content (a RAG chunk or tool output) containing the pattern.
Affected versions
>= 0.9.2, < 0.10.0. Fixed in v0.10.0 (there is no 0.9.7 release).
SKILL_MENTION_RE (the extract pattern) has been O(n²) since v0.9.2; exploitable on 0.9.2–0.9.5 with a large input (hundreds of KB).
v0.9.6 added a second, far more aggressive O(n²) in the strip pattern (introduced by the "keep label as readable text" change), so on 0.9.6 a small input is enough to hang the instance.
Both are fixed by the same patch.
Affected component
backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py (line numbers as of v0.9.6):
```python
line 2223 , used by extract_skill_ids_from_messages(), called unconditionally (~line 2625)
## Summary
Two regexes in `backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py` that parse `<$skillId|label>` skill-mention tags backtrack in O(n²) on input that contains `<
CVE-2026-59220: Open WebUI medium vulnerability | Advisories
followed by a long run with no closing `>`. Both run synchronously, on the asyncio event loop, on **every** chat completion with no feature gate. Because the default deployment is a single uvicorn worker, one such input pins a CPU core inside `re` and freezes the entire instance for all users until the worker is killed. Any authenticated user can trigger it with one chat message; it also fires accidentally on benign retrieved content (a RAG chunk or tool output) containing the pattern.
## Affected versions
`>= 0.9.2, < 0.10.0`. Fixed in **v0.10.0** (there is no 0.9.7 release).
- `SKILL_MENTION_RE` (the extract pattern) has been O(n²) since **v0.9.2**; exploitable on 0.9.2–0.9.5 with a large input (hundreds of KB).
- **v0.9.6** added a second, far more aggressive O(n²) in the strip pattern (introduced by the "keep label as readable text" change), so on 0.9.6 a small input is enough to hang the instance.
Both are fixed by the same patch.
## Affected component
`backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py` (line numbers as of v0.9.6):
```python
# line 2223 , used by extract_skill_ids_from_messages(), called unconditionally (~line 2625)
SKILL_MENTION_RE = re.compile(r'<\$([^|>]+)\|?[^>]*>')
# line 2247 , used by strip_skill_mentions(), called unconditionally (line 2662)
strip_re = re.compile(r'<\$[^|>]+\|?([^>]*)>')
```
`extract_skill_ids_from_messages()` runs before the `if all_skill_ids:` block (that guard gates only skill *injection*, not the regex), and `strip_skill_mentions()` runs with no guard at all. Neither requires a skill to exist or any setting to be enabled. Both functions are plain synchronous calls inside the async `process_chat_payload` coroutine, so they block the event loop; with the default `UVICORN_WORKERS=1` (`backend/start.sh`) the whole instance stalls.
## Root cause
`[^|>]` is a subset of `[^>]`, so the quantifier pair `[^|>]+ \|? [^>]*` is ambiguous: on input that never closes with `>`, `[^|>]+` greedily consumes the tail, `>` fails, and the engine backtracks through every split point between `[^|>]+` and `[^>]*` , O(n) positions each doing O(n) work. Polynomial, not exponential, but more than enough to hang a single worker on a ~100 KB input.
## Proof of concept
Standalone (no Open WebUI required):
```python
import re, time
EXTRACT = re.compile(r'<\$([^|>]+)\|?[^>]*>')
STRIP = re.compile(r'<\$[^|>]+\|?([^>]*)>')
for n in (8_000, 16_000, 32_000, 64_000):
s = '<#x27; + ('a' * n)
for name, rx in (('extract', EXTRACT), ('strip', STRIP)):
t = time.perf_counter(); rx.search(s)
print(f'n={n:>6} {name:>7} = {(time.perf_counter()-t)*1000:8.1f} ms')
```
Time quadruples per doubling of `n` (textbook O(n²)); the strip pattern runs for ~6 seconds on a 64k blob and for minutes on a ~96 KB one.
End-to-end against a live instance (default config):
1. `docker run ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:v0.9.6` on defaults.
2. Log in as any user (no admin or skill setup).
3. Send a chat message containing `<
CVE-2026-59220: Open WebUI medium vulnerability | Advisories
followed by 50k+ characters with no `>`.
4. One CPU core pegs in `re`; UI and API stop responding for every user until the worker is killed.
## Patch
Rewrite the optional `|label` as a non-capturing optional group so the two quantifiers no longer overlap. Both patterns become linear; captures and substituted output are unchanged on well-formed `<$id|label>`, `<$id|>`, and bare `<$id>` mentions.
```python
SKILL_MENTION_RE = re.compile(r'<\$([^|>]+)(?:\|[^>]*)?>')
strip_re = re.compile(r'<\$[^|>]+(?:\|([^>]*))?>')
```
After the patch the same hostile input returns in under 1 ms. Shipped in v0.10.0.
## Credit
Reported by @Vlad-WKG, including a correct root-cause analysis and patch.
Two regexes in backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py that parse <$skillId|label> skill-mention tags backtrack in O(n²) on input that contains <$ followed by a long run with no closing >. Both run synchronously, on the asyncio event loop, on every chat completion with no feature gate. Because the default deployment is a single uvicorn worker, one such input pins a CPU core inside re and freezes the entire instance for all users until the worker is killed. Any authenticated user can trigger it with one chat message; it also fires accidentally on benign retrieved content (a RAG chunk or tool output) containing the pattern.
Affected versions
>= 0.9.2, < 0.10.0. Fixed in v0.10.0 (there is no 0.9.7 release).
SKILL_MENTION_RE (the extract pattern) has been O(n²) since v0.9.2; exploitable on 0.9.2–0.9.5 with a large input (hundreds of KB).
v0.9.6 added a second, far more aggressive O(n²) in the strip pattern (introduced by the "keep label as readable text" change), so on 0.9.6 a small input is enough to hang the instance.
Both are fixed by the same patch.
Affected component
backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py (line numbers as of v0.9.6):
```python
line 2223 , used by extract_skill_ids_from_messages(), called unconditionally (~line 2625)
## Summary
Two regexes in `backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py` that parse `<$skillId|label>` skill-mention tags backtrack in O(n²) on input that contains `<
CVE-2026-59220: Open WebUI medium vulnerability | Advisories
followed by a long run with no closing `>`. Both run synchronously, on the asyncio event loop, on **every** chat completion with no feature gate. Because the default deployment is a single uvicorn worker, one such input pins a CPU core inside `re` and freezes the entire instance for all users until the worker is killed. Any authenticated user can trigger it with one chat message; it also fires accidentally on benign retrieved content (a RAG chunk or tool output) containing the pattern.
## Affected versions
`>= 0.9.2, < 0.10.0`. Fixed in **v0.10.0** (there is no 0.9.7 release).
- `SKILL_MENTION_RE` (the extract pattern) has been O(n²) since **v0.9.2**; exploitable on 0.9.2–0.9.5 with a large input (hundreds of KB).
- **v0.9.6** added a second, far more aggressive O(n²) in the strip pattern (introduced by the "keep label as readable text" change), so on 0.9.6 a small input is enough to hang the instance.
Both are fixed by the same patch.
## Affected component
`backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py` (line numbers as of v0.9.6):
```python
# line 2223 , used by extract_skill_ids_from_messages(), called unconditionally (~line 2625)
SKILL_MENTION_RE = re.compile(r'<\$([^|>]+)\|?[^>]*>')
# line 2247 , used by strip_skill_mentions(), called unconditionally (line 2662)
strip_re = re.compile(r'<\$[^|>]+\|?([^>]*)>')
```
`extract_skill_ids_from_messages()` runs before the `if all_skill_ids:` block (that guard gates only skill *injection*, not the regex), and `strip_skill_mentions()` runs with no guard at all. Neither requires a skill to exist or any setting to be enabled. Both functions are plain synchronous calls inside the async `process_chat_payload` coroutine, so they block the event loop; with the default `UVICORN_WORKERS=1` (`backend/start.sh`) the whole instance stalls.
## Root cause
`[^|>]` is a subset of `[^>]`, so the quantifier pair `[^|>]+ \|? [^>]*` is ambiguous: on input that never closes with `>`, `[^|>]+` greedily consumes the tail, `>` fails, and the engine backtracks through every split point between `[^|>]+` and `[^>]*` , O(n) positions each doing O(n) work. Polynomial, not exponential, but more than enough to hang a single worker on a ~100 KB input.
## Proof of concept
Standalone (no Open WebUI required):
```python
import re, time
EXTRACT = re.compile(r'<\$([^|>]+)\|?[^>]*>')
STRIP = re.compile(r'<\$[^|>]+\|?([^>]*)>')
for n in (8_000, 16_000, 32_000, 64_000):
s = '<#x27; + ('a' * n)
for name, rx in (('extract', EXTRACT), ('strip', STRIP)):
t = time.perf_counter(); rx.search(s)
print(f'n={n:>6} {name:>7} = {(time.perf_counter()-t)*1000:8.1f} ms')
```
Time quadruples per doubling of `n` (textbook O(n²)); the strip pattern runs for ~6 seconds on a 64k blob and for minutes on a ~96 KB one.
End-to-end against a live instance (default config):
1. `docker run ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:v0.9.6` on defaults.
2. Log in as any user (no admin or skill setup).
3. Send a chat message containing `<
CVE-2026-59220: Open WebUI medium vulnerability | Advisories
followed by 50k+ characters with no `>`.
4. One CPU core pegs in `re`; UI and API stop responding for every user until the worker is killed.
## Patch
Rewrite the optional `|label` as a non-capturing optional group so the two quantifiers no longer overlap. Both patterns become linear; captures and substituted output are unchanged on well-formed `<$id|label>`, `<$id|>`, and bare `<$id>` mentions.
```python
SKILL_MENTION_RE = re.compile(r'<\$([^|>]+)(?:\|[^>]*)?>')
strip_re = re.compile(r'<\$[^|>]+(?:\|([^>]*))?>')
```
After the patch the same hostile input returns in under 1 ms. Shipped in v0.10.0.
## Credit
Reported by @Vlad-WKG, including a correct root-cause analysis and patch.
followed by a long run with no closing `>`. Both run synchronously, on the asyncio event loop, on **every** chat completion with no feature gate. Because the default deployment is a single uvicorn worker, one such input pins a CPU core inside `re` and freezes the entire instance for all users until the worker is killed. Any authenticated user can trigger it with one chat message; it also fires accidentally on benign retrieved content (a RAG chunk or tool output) containing the pattern.\n\n## Affected versions\n`>= 0.9.2, \u003c 0.10.0`. Fixed in **v0.10.0** (there is no 0.9.7 release).\n- `SKILL_MENTION_RE` (the extract pattern) has been O(n²) since **v0.9.2**; exploitable on 0.9.2–0.9.5 with a large input (hundreds of KB).\n- **v0.9.6** added a second, far more aggressive O(n²) in the strip pattern (introduced by the \"keep label as readable text\" change), so on 0.9.6 a small input is enough to hang the instance.\n\nBoth are fixed by the same patch.\n\n## Affected component\n`backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py` (line numbers as of v0.9.6):\n\n```python\n# line 2223 , used by extract_skill_ids_from_messages(), called unconditionally (~line 2625)\nSKILL_MENTION_RE = re.compile(r'\u003c\\$([^|>]+)\\|?[^>]*>')\n\n# line 2247 , used by strip_skill_mentions(), called unconditionally (line 2662)\nstrip_re = re.compile(r'\u003c\\$[^|>]+\\|?([^>]*)>')\n```\n\n`extract_skill_ids_from_messages()` runs before the `if all_skill_ids:` block (that guard gates only skill *injection*, not the regex), and `strip_skill_mentions()` runs with no guard at all. Neither requires a skill to exist or any setting to be enabled. Both functions are plain synchronous calls inside the async `process_chat_payload` coroutine, so they block the event loop; with the default `UVICORN_WORKERS=1` (`backend/start.sh`) the whole instance stalls.\n\n## Root cause\n`[^|>]` is a subset of `[^>]`, so the quantifier pair `[^|>]+ \\|? [^>]*` is ambiguous: on input that never closes with `>`, `[^|>]+` greedily consumes the tail, `>` fails, and the engine backtracks through every split point between `[^|>]+` and `[^>]*` , O(n) positions each doing O(n) work. Polynomial, not exponential, but more than enough to hang a single worker on a ~100 KB input.\n\n## Proof of concept\nStandalone (no Open WebUI required):\n\n```python\nimport re, time\nEXTRACT = re.compile(r'\u003c\\$([^|>]+)\\|?[^>]*>')\nSTRIP = re.compile(r'\u003c\\$[^|>]+\\|?([^>]*)>')\nfor n in (8_000, 16_000, 32_000, 64_000):\n s = '\u003c
+ ('a' * n)\n for name, rx in (('extract', EXTRACT), ('strip', STRIP)):\n t = time.perf_counter(); rx.search(s)\n print(f'n={n:>6} {name:>7} = {(time.perf_counter()-t)*1000:8.1f} ms')\n```\n\nTime quadruples per doubling of `n` (textbook O(n²)); the strip pattern runs for ~6 seconds on a 64k blob and for minutes on a ~96 KB one.\n\nEnd-to-end against a live instance (default config):\n1. `docker run ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:v0.9.6` on defaults.\n2. Log in as any user (no admin or skill setup).\n3. Send a chat message containing `\u003c
CVE-2026-59220: Open WebUI medium vulnerability | Advisories
Two regexes in backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py that parse <$skillId|label> skill-mention tags backtrack in O(n²) on input that contains <$ followed by a long run with no closing >. Both run synchronously, on the asyncio event loop, on every chat completion with no feature gate. Because the default deployment is a single uvicorn worker, one such input pins a CPU core inside re and freezes the entire instance for all users until the worker is killed. Any authenticated user can trigger it with one chat message; it also fires accidentally on benign retrieved content (a RAG chunk or tool output) containing the pattern.
Affected versions
>= 0.9.2, < 0.10.0. Fixed in v0.10.0 (there is no 0.9.7 release).
SKILL_MENTION_RE (the extract pattern) has been O(n²) since v0.9.2; exploitable on 0.9.2–0.9.5 with a large input (hundreds of KB).
v0.9.6 added a second, far more aggressive O(n²) in the strip pattern (introduced by the "keep label as readable text" change), so on 0.9.6 a small input is enough to hang the instance.
Both are fixed by the same patch.
Affected component
backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py (line numbers as of v0.9.6):
```python
line 2223 , used by extract_skill_ids_from_messages(), called unconditionally (~line 2625)
## Summary
Two regexes in `backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py` that parse `<$skillId|label>` skill-mention tags backtrack in O(n²) on input that contains `<
CVE-2026-59220: Open WebUI medium vulnerability | Advisories
followed by a long run with no closing `>`. Both run synchronously, on the asyncio event loop, on **every** chat completion with no feature gate. Because the default deployment is a single uvicorn worker, one such input pins a CPU core inside `re` and freezes the entire instance for all users until the worker is killed. Any authenticated user can trigger it with one chat message; it also fires accidentally on benign retrieved content (a RAG chunk or tool output) containing the pattern.
## Affected versions
`>= 0.9.2, < 0.10.0`. Fixed in **v0.10.0** (there is no 0.9.7 release).
- `SKILL_MENTION_RE` (the extract pattern) has been O(n²) since **v0.9.2**; exploitable on 0.9.2–0.9.5 with a large input (hundreds of KB).
- **v0.9.6** added a second, far more aggressive O(n²) in the strip pattern (introduced by the "keep label as readable text" change), so on 0.9.6 a small input is enough to hang the instance.
Both are fixed by the same patch.
## Affected component
`backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py` (line numbers as of v0.9.6):
```python
# line 2223 , used by extract_skill_ids_from_messages(), called unconditionally (~line 2625)
SKILL_MENTION_RE = re.compile(r'<\$([^|>]+)\|?[^>]*>')
# line 2247 , used by strip_skill_mentions(), called unconditionally (line 2662)
strip_re = re.compile(r'<\$[^|>]+\|?([^>]*)>')
```
`extract_skill_ids_from_messages()` runs before the `if all_skill_ids:` block (that guard gates only skill *injection*, not the regex), and `strip_skill_mentions()` runs with no guard at all. Neither requires a skill to exist or any setting to be enabled. Both functions are plain synchronous calls inside the async `process_chat_payload` coroutine, so they block the event loop; with the default `UVICORN_WORKERS=1` (`backend/start.sh`) the whole instance stalls.
## Root cause
`[^|>]` is a subset of `[^>]`, so the quantifier pair `[^|>]+ \|? [^>]*` is ambiguous: on input that never closes with `>`, `[^|>]+` greedily consumes the tail, `>` fails, and the engine backtracks through every split point between `[^|>]+` and `[^>]*` , O(n) positions each doing O(n) work. Polynomial, not exponential, but more than enough to hang a single worker on a ~100 KB input.
## Proof of concept
Standalone (no Open WebUI required):
```python
import re, time
EXTRACT = re.compile(r'<\$([^|>]+)\|?[^>]*>')
STRIP = re.compile(r'<\$[^|>]+\|?([^>]*)>')
for n in (8_000, 16_000, 32_000, 64_000):
s = '<#x27; + ('a' * n)
for name, rx in (('extract', EXTRACT), ('strip', STRIP)):
t = time.perf_counter(); rx.search(s)
print(f'n={n:>6} {name:>7} = {(time.perf_counter()-t)*1000:8.1f} ms')
```
Time quadruples per doubling of `n` (textbook O(n²)); the strip pattern runs for ~6 seconds on a 64k blob and for minutes on a ~96 KB one.
End-to-end against a live instance (default config):
1. `docker run ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:v0.9.6` on defaults.
2. Log in as any user (no admin or skill setup).
3. Send a chat message containing `<
CVE-2026-59220: Open WebUI medium vulnerability | Advisories
followed by 50k+ characters with no `>`.
4. One CPU core pegs in `re`; UI and API stop responding for every user until the worker is killed.
## Patch
Rewrite the optional `|label` as a non-capturing optional group so the two quantifiers no longer overlap. Both patterns become linear; captures and substituted output are unchanged on well-formed `<$id|label>`, `<$id|>`, and bare `<$id>` mentions.
```python
SKILL_MENTION_RE = re.compile(r'<\$([^|>]+)(?:\|[^>]*)?>')
strip_re = re.compile(r'<\$[^|>]+(?:\|([^>]*))?>')
```
After the patch the same hostile input returns in under 1 ms. Shipped in v0.10.0.
## Credit
Reported by @Vlad-WKG, including a correct root-cause analysis and patch.
followed by 50k+ characters with no `>`.\n4. One CPU core pegs in `re`; UI and API stop responding for every user until the worker is killed.\n\n## Patch\nRewrite the optional `|label` as a non-capturing optional group so the two quantifiers no longer overlap. Both patterns become linear; captures and substituted output are unchanged on well-formed `\u003c$id|label>`, `\u003c$id|>`, and bare `\u003c$id>` mentions.\n\n```python\nSKILL_MENTION_RE = re.compile(r'\u003c\\$([^|>]+)(?:\\|[^>]*)?>')\nstrip_re = re.compile(r'\u003c\\$[^|>]+(?:\\|([^>]*))?>')\n```\n\nAfter the patch the same hostile input returns in under 1 ms. Shipped in v0.10.0.\n\n## Credit\nReported by @Vlad-WKG, including a correct root-cause analysis and patch.","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","cvssVersion":"3.1","severitySource":"github","cwes":["CWE-1333"],"refs":["https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-ffpj-xv5c-p3gw","https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59220","https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/61a26722155ec6ee1b629cf8dfcf975098c18331","https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui","https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.10.0"],"affected":[{"product":"open-webui","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"open-webui","introduced":"0.9.2","fixed":"0.10.0","lastAffected":""}],"changes":[]},"related":[{"id":"GHSA-frvj-c5qp-xj4w","cve":"CVE-2026-59221","aliases":["CVE-2026-59221","PYSEC-2026-3597"],"summary":"open-webui terminal proxy path traversal guard bypass via 9x encoded traversal","title":"open-webui terminal proxy path traversal guard bypass via 9x encoded traversal","severity":"high","score":7.7,"product":"open-webui","productLabel":"","products":["open-webui"],"fixed":"0.10.0","fixFirst":"0.10.0","fixedN":1,"published":"2026-07-24","modified":"2026-08-04","withdrawn":"","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-frvj-c5qp-xj4w","foundAt":"2026-09-24 23:00:22"},{"id":"GHSA-m3qf-58wf-w979","cve":"CVE-2026-59225","aliases":["CVE-2026-59225","PYSEC-2026-3601"],"summary":"Open WebUI: Arena task endpoints can bypass underlying model access controls","title":"Open WebUI: Arena task endpoints can bypass underlying model access controls","severity":"medium","score":5.4,"product":"open-webui","productLabel":"","products":["open-webui"],"fixed":"0.10.0","fixFirst":"0.10.0","fixedN":1,"published":"2026-07-24","modified":"2026-08-04","withdrawn":"","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m3qf-58wf-w979","foundAt":"2026-09-24 23:00:22"},{"id":"GHSA-2xwm-4h2q-ggfx","cve":"CVE-2026-59212","aliases":["CVE-2026-59212","PYSEC-2026-3588"],"summary":"Open WebUI: Model meta.knowledge read-only file access can be upgraded to file write/delete","title":"Open WebUI: Model meta.knowledge read-only file access can be upgraded to file write/delete","severity":"medium","score":5.4,"product":"open-webui","productLabel":"","products":["open-webui"],"fixed":"0.10.0","fixFirst":"0.10.0","fixedN":1,"published":"2026-07-24","modified":"2026-08-04","withdrawn":"","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2xwm-4h2q-ggfx","foundAt":"2026-09-24 23:00:22"},{"id":"GHSA-j657-m4c4-24jq","cve":"CVE-2026-59224","aliases":["CVE-2026-59224","PYSEC-2026-3600"],"summary":"Open WebUI: Terminal proxy forwards a spoofable, integrity-unbound user identity to the upstream (X-User-Id header and ws_terminal session_id query injection)","title":"Open WebUI: server-side request forgery","severity":"high","score":8,"product":"open-webui","productLabel":"","products":["open-webui"],"fixed":"0.10.0","fixFirst":"0.10.0","fixedN":1,"published":"2026-07-24","modified":"2026-08-04","withdrawn":"","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j657-m4c4-24jq","foundAt":"2026-09-24 23:00:22"},{"id":"GHSA-qg3f-8x3j-ggf2","cve":"CVE-2026-59223","aliases":["CVE-2026-59223","PYSEC-2026-3603"],"summary":"Open WebUI: `WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST` host allow/block filter bypassable via URL path and non-label-boundary matching","title":"Open WebUI: protection mechanism failure","severity":"medium","score":4.3,"product":"open-webui","productLabel":"","products":["open-webui"],"fixed":"0.10.0","fixFirst":"0.10.0","fixedN":1,"published":"2026-07-24","modified":"2026-08-04","withdrawn":"","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qg3f-8x3j-ggf2","foundAt":"2026-09-24 23:00:22"},{"id":"GHSA-gh7p-78x6-jw6m","cve":"CVE-2026-59222","aliases":["CVE-2026-59222","PYSEC-2026-3598"],"summary":"Open WebUI: /api/v1/channels/{id}/members exposes full user model including sensitive credentials","title":"Open WebUI: /api/v1/channels/{id}/members exposes full user model including sensitive credentials","severity":"medium","score":null,"product":"open-webui","productLabel":"","products":["open-webui"],"fixed":"0.10.0","fixFirst":"0.10.0","fixedN":1,"published":"2026-07-24","modified":"2026-08-04","withdrawn":"","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gh7p-78x6-jw6m","foundAt":"2026-09-24 23:00:22"}]}}