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Severe, 6 weeks1498Projects326

1498 severe, 6 weeks · 326 projects

LangflowGHSA-9c59-2mvc-vfr8

Langflow: IDOR/BOLA in Monitor API , Missing Ownership Enforcement on 7 Endpoints

Langflow

CVE-2026-33760 · Published Jun 16, 2026 · updated Jul 20, 2026

High8.8
Fix: upgrade to 1.9.0 or later
GitHub advisory

Summary

Langflow's /api/v1/monitor router exposes 7 endpoints that perform read, write, and delete operations on user-owned resources , messages, sessions, build artifacts, and LLM transaction logs , without verifying that the authenticated requester owns the targeted resource. Any authenticated user can read, modify, rename, or permanently delete another user's data by supplying the target's resource ID or flow_id. This is a classic IDOR/BOLA vulnerability. Notably, the same source file (monitor.py) contains one correctly-implemented endpoint that uses an ownership check, demonstrating the correct pattern was known but inconsistently applied.

Details

**Source file: src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/monitor.py**

The correct pattern (used only in GET /monitor/messages, lines 77–80):

```python

stmt = select(MessageTable)

stmt = stmt.join(Flow, MessageTable.flow_id == Flow.id)

stmt = stmt.where(Flow.user_id == current_user.id) # ownership enforced

`

All 7 vulnerable endpoints are missing this guard:

**1. GET /api/v1/monitor/builds (lines 27–33)** , reads build data for any flow_id:

```python

@router.get("/builds", dependencies=[Depends(get_current_active_user)])

async def get_vertex_builds(flow_id: Annotated[UUID, Query()], session: DbSession):

vertex_builds = await get_vertex_builds_by_flow_id(session, flow_id) # no ownership check...

Affected versions

PackageAffectedFixed in
langflow
PyPI
< 1.9.01.9.0
Details and references

### Summary Langflow's `/api/v1/monitor` router exposes 7 endpoints that perform read, write, and delete operations on user-owned resources , messages, sessions, build artifacts, and LLM transaction logs , without verifying that the authenticated requester owns the targeted resource. Any authenticated user can read, modify, rename, or permanently delete another user's data by supplying the target's resource ID or `flow_id`. This is a classic IDOR/BOLA vulnerability. Notably, the same source file (`monitor.py`) contains one correctly-implemented endpoint that uses an ownership check, demonstrating the correct pattern was known but inconsistently applied. ### Details **Source file: `src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/monitor.py`** The correct pattern (used only in `GET /monitor/messages`, lines 77–80): ```python stmt = select(MessageTable) stmt = stmt.join(Flow, MessageTable.flow_id == Flow.id) stmt = stmt.where(Flow.user_id == current_user.id) # ownership enforced ``` All 7 vulnerable endpoints are missing this guard: **1. `GET /api/v1/monitor/builds` (lines 27–33)** , reads build data for any `flow_id`: ```python @router.get("/builds", dependencies=[Depends(get_current_active_user)]) async def get_vertex_builds(flow_id: Annotated[UUID, Query()], session: DbSession): vertex_builds = await get_vertex_builds_by_flow_id(session, flow_id) # no ownership check return VertexBuildMapModel.from_list_of_dicts(vertex_builds) ``` **2. `DELETE /api/v1/monitor/messages` (lines 102–107)** , deletes any message by UUID: ```python @router.delete("/messages", status_code=204, dependencies=[Depends(get_current_active_user)]) async def delete_messages(message_ids: list[UUID], session: DbSession): await session.exec(delete(MessageTable).where(MessageTable.id.in_(message_ids))) # message_ids accepted verbatim, no ownership check ``` **3. `PUT /api/v1/monitor/messages/{message_id}` (lines 110–134)** , overwrites any message: ```python db_message = await session.get(MessageTable, message_id) # no check: db_message.flow_id → Flow.user_id == current_user.id db_message.sqlmodel_update(message_dict) ``` **4. `PATCH /api/v1/monitor/messages/session/{old_session_id}` (lines 137–171)** , renames any session: ```python stmt = select(MessageTable).where(MessageTable.session_id == old_session_id) # no JOIN to Flow, no WHERE Flow.user_id == current_user.id ``` **5. `DELETE /api/v1/monitor/messages/session/{session_id}` (lines 174–188)** , bulk-deletes any session: ```python await session.exec( delete(MessageTable).where(col(MessageTable.session_id) == session_id) # no ownership filter ) ``` **6. `GET /api/v1/monitor/transactions` (lines 191–211)** , reads LLM prompt/response logs for any `flow_id`: ```python stmt = select(TransactionTable).where(TransactionTable.flow_id == flow_id) # no JOIN to Flow, no WHERE Flow.user_id == current_user.id ``` **7. `DELETE /api/v1/monitor/builds`** , deletes build records for any `flow_id`: Shares the same root cause as endpoint #1 (`GET /builds`): `flow_id` is accepted as a bare query parameter and passed to the deletion path without a `WHERE Flow.user_id == current_user.id` ownership check, so any authenticated user can destroy another user's build artifacts. ### PoC Tested on Langflow v1.7.3 (`langflowai/langflow:1.7.3`) with two accounts: `langflow` (victim) and `attacker_test` (attacker). ```bash # Setup: authenticate both users TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/login \ -d "username=langflow&password=langflow" \ | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['access_token'])") ATTKR=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/login \ -d "username=attacker_test&password=Attacker123" \ | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['access_token'])") # Victim creates a flow (attacker only needs to know the flow_id , obtainable via brute force or enumeration) FLOW_ID=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/flows/ \

CVSS 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Severity from
GitHub (reviewed advisory)
Weakness
CWE-639
Also known as
CVE-2026-33760, PYSEC-2026-242

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