AI and data stack advisories

Severe, 6 weeks1496Projects326

1496 severe, 6 weeks · 326 projects

MinIOGHSA-9c4q-hq6p-c237

MinIO has an Unauthenticated Object Write via Missing Signature Verification in Unsigned-Trailer Uploads

MinIO

CVE-2026-40344 · Published Apr 14, 2026 · updated Oct 8, 2026

High8.2
No fix yet
GitHub advisory

Impact

Two authentication bypass vulnerabilities in MinIO's STREAMING-UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD-TRAILER code path

allow any user who knows a valid access key to write arbitrary objects to any bucket without knowing

the secret key or providing a valid cryptographic signature.

Any MinIO deployment is impacted. The attack requires only a valid access key (the well-known default

minioadmin, or any key with WRITE permission on a bucket) and a target bucket name.

There are two vulnerabilities:

1. Missing Signature Verification in PutObjectExtractHandler / Snowball (CWE-306)

2. Signature Verification Bypass via Query-String Credentials (CWE-287)

Vulnerability 1 , Missing signature verification in PutObjectExtractHandler (Snowball)

When authTypeStreamingUnsignedTrailer support was added (commit 76913a9fd, PR #16484), the new auth

type was handled in PutObjectHandler and PutObjectPartHandler but was never added to

PutObjectExtractHandler. The snowball auto-extract handler's switch rAuthType block has no case for

authTypeStreamingUnsignedTrailer, so execution falls through with zero signature verification. The

isPutActionAllowed call before the switch extracts the access key and checks IAM permissions, but

does not verify the cryptographic signature.

An attacker sends a PUT request with X-Amz-Content-Sha256: STREAMING-UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD-TRAILER,...

Affected versions

PackageAffectedFixed in
github.com/minio/minio
Go
>= 0.0.0-20230506025312-76913a9fd5c6, <= 0.0.0-20260212201848-7aac2a2c5b7cNo fix yet
Details and references

### Impact Two authentication bypass vulnerabilities in MinIO's `STREAMING-UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD-TRAILER` code path allow any user who knows a valid access key to write arbitrary objects to any bucket without knowing the secret key or providing a valid cryptographic signature. Any MinIO deployment is impacted. The attack requires only a valid access key (the well-known default `minioadmin`, or any key with WRITE permission on a bucket) and a target bucket name. There are two vulnerabilities: 1. Missing Signature Verification in PutObjectExtractHandler / Snowball (CWE-306) 2. Signature Verification Bypass via Query-String Credentials (CWE-287) **Vulnerability 1 , Missing signature verification in PutObjectExtractHandler (Snowball)** When `authTypeStreamingUnsignedTrailer` support was added (commit 76913a9fd, PR #16484), the new auth type was handled in `PutObjectHandler` and `PutObjectPartHandler` but was never added to `PutObjectExtractHandler`. The snowball auto-extract handler's `switch rAuthType` block has no case for `authTypeStreamingUnsignedTrailer`, so execution falls through with zero signature verification. The `isPutActionAllowed` call before the switch extracts the access key and checks IAM permissions, but does not verify the cryptographic signature. An attacker sends a PUT request with `X-Amz-Content-Sha256: STREAMING-UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD-TRAILER`, `X-Amz-Meta-Snowball-Auto-Extract: true`, and an `Authorization` header containing a valid access key with a completely fabricated signature. The request is accepted and the tar payload is extracted into the bucket. **Affected component:** `cmd/object-handlers.go`, function `PutObjectExtractHandler`. **Vulnerability 2 , Signature verification bypass via query-string credentials** `PutObjectHandler` and `PutObjectPartHandler` call `newUnsignedV4ChunkedReader` with a signature verification gate based solely on the presence of the `Authorization` header: ```go newUnsignedV4ChunkedReader(r, true, r.Header.Get(xhttp.Authorization) != "") ``` Meanwhile, `isPutActionAllowed` extracts credentials from either the `Authorization` header or the `X-Amz-Credential` query parameter, and trusts whichever it finds. An attacker omits the `Authorization` header and supplies credentials exclusively via the query string. The signature gate evaluates to `false`, `doesSignatureMatch` is never called, and the request proceeds with the permissions of the impersonated access key. **Affected components:** `cmd/object-handlers.go` (`PutObjectHandler`), `cmd/object-multipart-handlers.go` (`PutObjectPartHandler`). **CVSS v4.0 Score:** 8.8 (High) **Vector:** `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` **CWE:** CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function), CWE-287 (Improper Authentication) ### Affected Versions All MinIO releases through the final release of the minio/minio open-source project. Both vulnerabilities were introduced in commit [`76913a9fd`](https://github.com/minio/minio/commit/76913a9fd5c6e5c2dbd4e8c7faf56ed9e9e24091) ("Signed trailers for signature v4", [PR #16484](https://github.com/minio/minio/pull/16484)), which added `authTypeStreamingUnsignedTrailer` support. The first affected release is `RELEASE.2023-05-18T00-05-36Z`. ### Patches **Fixed in**: MinIO AIStor RELEASE.2026-04-11T03-20-12Z #### Binary Downloads | Platform | Architecture | Download | | -------- | ------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Linux | amd64 | [minio](https://dl.min.io/aistor/minio/release/linux-amd64/minio) | | Linux | arm64 | [minio](https://dl.min.io/aistor/minio/release/linux-arm64/minio) | | macOS | arm64 | [minio](https://dl.min.io/aistor/minio/release/darwin-arm64/minio) | | macOS | amd64 | [minio](https://dl.min.io/aistor/minio/release/darwin-amd64/minio) |

CVSS 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L
Severity from
GitHub (reviewed advisory)
Weakness
CWE-287, CWE-306
Also known as
CVE-2026-40344, GO-2026-5284

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