Open WebUI Vulnerable to Unauthenticated RAG Configuration Disclosure
Medium5.3CVE-2026-45397 · Published May 14, 2026 · updated Jul 13, 2026
Affected versions
| Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| open-webui PyPI | < 0.9.5 | 0.9.5 |
Details and references
**Vulnerability Type:** Information Disclosure / Missing Authentication **Severity:** Medium **Component:** `backend/open_webui/routers/retrieval.py` , `get_status()` (`GET /`) **Affected Endpoint:** `GET /api/v1/retrieval/` **Affected Version:** Open WebUI `main` branch , confirmed unpatched through **v0.9.2** **Authentication Required:** None , internet-facing with zero credentials **CVSSv3.1 Score:** 5.3 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N) --- ## Summary `GET /api/v1/retrieval/` returns live RAG pipeline configuration to any unauthenticated HTTP client. No `Authorization` header, cookie, or API key is required. Every adjacent endpoint on the same router (`/embedding`, `/config`) is correctly guarded by `get_admin_user` making this a targeted omission. --- ## Root Cause `backend/open_webui/routers/retrieval.py:262` ```python @router.get('/') async def get_status(request: Request): # ← no Depends(get_verified_user) return { 'status': True, 'CHUNK_SIZE': request.app.state.config.CHUNK_SIZE, 'CHUNK_OVERLAP': request.app.state.config.CHUNK_OVERLAP, 'RAG_TEMPLATE': request.app.state.config.RAG_TEMPLATE, 'RAG_EMBEDDING_ENGINE': request.app.state.config.RAG_EMBEDDING_ENGINE, 'RAG_EMBEDDING_MODEL': request.app.state.config.RAG_EMBEDDING_MODEL, 'RAG_RERANKING_MODEL': request.app.state.config.RAG_RERANKING_MODEL, 'RAG_EMBEDDING_BATCH_SIZE': request.app.state.config.RAG_EMBEDDING_BATCH_SIZE, 'ENABLE_ASYNC_EMBEDDING': request.app.state.config.ENABLE_ASYNC_EMBEDDING, 'RAG_EMBEDDING_CONCURRENT_REQUESTS': request.app.state.config.RAG_EMBEDDING_CONCURRENT_REQUESTS, } ``` Compare with every adjacent endpoint on the same router: ```python @router.get('/embedding') async def get_embedding_config(request: Request, user=Depends(get_admin_user)): # ✅ @router.get('/config') async def get_rag_config(request: Request, user=Depends(get_admin_user)): # ✅ ``` --- ## Proof Of Concept , No Token Required ```bash curl -s http://TARGET/api/v1/retrieval/ ``` ```json { "status": true, "CHUNK_SIZE": 1000, "CHUNK_OVERLAP": 100, "RAG_TEMPLATE": "### Task:\nRespond to the user query using the provided context...\n<context>\n{{CONTEXT}}\n</context>", "RAG_EMBEDDING_ENGINE": "", "RAG_EMBEDDING_MODEL": "sentence-transformers/all-MiniLM-L6-v2", "RAG_RERANKING_MODEL": "", "RAG_EMBEDDING_BATCH_SIZE": 1, "ENABLE_ASYNC_EMBEDDING": true, "RAG_EMBEDDING_CONCURRENT_REQUESTS": 0 } ``` --- ## Disclosed Information and Its Value to an Attacker | Field | What it reveals | |---|---| | `RAG_EMBEDDING_ENGINE` | Backend type (OpenAI, Ollama, Azure, etc.) | | `RAG_EMBEDDING_MODEL` | Exact model name , reveals embedding model | | `RAG_RERANKING_MODEL` | Reranker in use , reveals reranker | | `RAG_TEMPLATE` | **RAG template** , exposes the RAG template | | `CHUNK_SIZE` / `CHUNK_OVERLAP` | Chunking parameters , enables exact reconstruction of how documents are split and retrieved | --- ## Attack Scenario 1. Attacker sends one unauthenticated HTTP GET to `/api/v1/retrieval/`. 2. Response reveals the embedding model and chunking parameters. 3. Attacker uses the exact chunk size/overlap to craft RAG poisoning payloads that are guaranteed to be retrieved. --- ## Impact 1. **RAG template disclosure** 2. **Infrastructure fingerprinting** , embedding engine and model name reveal the AI stack to an internet scanner 3. **RAG attack surface mapping** , chunk parameters enable precise calculation of retrieval boundaries 4. **Zero-effort recon** , no brute force, no credentials, no rate-limit concern. Single request from any IP. --- ## Recommended Fix Add `get_verified_user` dependency (or `get_admin_user` for stricter control): ```python # BEFORE (vulnerable) @router.get('/') async def get_status(request: Request): # AFTER @router.get('/') async def get_status(request: Request, user=Depends(get_verified_user)): ```
- CVSS 3.1
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
- Severity from
- GitHub (reviewed advisory)
- Weakness
- CWE-306
- Also known as
- CVE-2026-45397, PYSEC-2026-2706
More Open WebUI advisories
All Open WebUI| Date | Advisory | Severity | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| May 14 | Open WebUI has Stored Cross-Site Scripting In Profile Picture CVE-2026-45299Medium5.4fixed in 0.8.0 | Medium5.4 | 0.8.0 |
| May 14 | Open WebUI: Missing permission check in files API allows authenticated users to list, access and delete every uploaded file CVE-2026-45301High8.1fixed in 0.3.16 | High8.1 | 0.3.16 |
| May 14 | Open WebUI has stored XSS via the HTML renedering view CVE-2026-45303High7.7fixed in 0.6.5 | High7.7 | 0.6.5 |
| May 14 | Open WebUI has stored XSS via attacker-controlled file extension in /api/v1/audio/transcriptions CVE-2026-45315High8.7fixed in 0.9.3 | High8.7 | 0.9.3 |
| May 14 | Open WebUI has XSS via SVG in /api/v1/channels/webhooks/{webhook_id}/profile/image CVE-2026-45314High6.1fixed in 0.9.3 | High6.1 | 0.9.3 |
| May 14 | Open WebUI: Read-Only Users Can Toggle Note Pin Status via Incorrect Permission Check (Write via Read-Only Access) CVE-2026-45316Low3.5fixed in 0.9.3 | Low3.5 | 0.9.3 |