Flowise: insecure direct object reference
Summary
The text-to-speech generation endpoint (POST /api/v1/text-to-speech/generate) is whitelisted (no auth) and accepts a credentialId directly in the request body. When called without a chatflowId, the endpoint uses the provided credentialId to decrypt the stored credential (e.g., OpenAI or ElevenLabs API key) and generate speech.
Root Cause
```typescript
// packages/server/src/controllers/text-to-speech/index.ts:58-64
} else {
// Use TTS config from request body
provider = bodyProvider
credentialId = bodyCredentialId // ← attacker-controlled credential ID
voice = bodyVoice
model = bodyModel
}
`
Docker Validation
POST /api/v1/text-to-speech/generate with arbitrary credentialId in body: endpoint processes request, sends SSE tts_start event, only fails when credential doesn't exist , proves code path runs without authentication.
Impact
- Use victim's API keys (OpenAI, ElevenLabs, Azure, Google) without authorization
- Burn API credits on the victim's account
- Generate unlimited speech content at victim's expense
- Combined with credential ID leak from Finding 2, this is trivially exploitable
Suggested Fix
Remove the TTS endpoint from WHITELIST_URLS or validate that the credential belongs to the chatflow being used:
```typescript
// Only allow credentialId when it matches the chatflow's TTS configuration...
Affected versions
| Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| flowise npm | < 3.1.0 | 3.1.0 |
Details and references
### Summary The text-to-speech generation endpoint (`POST /api/v1/text-to-speech/generate`) is whitelisted (no auth) and accepts a `credentialId` directly in the request body. When called without a `chatflowId`, the endpoint uses the provided `credentialId` to decrypt the stored credential (e.g., OpenAI or ElevenLabs API key) and generate speech. ### Root Cause ```typescript // packages/server/src/controllers/text-to-speech/index.ts:58-64 } else { // Use TTS config from request body provider = bodyProvider credentialId = bodyCredentialId // ← attacker-controlled credential ID voice = bodyVoice model = bodyModel } ``` ### Docker Validation `POST /api/v1/text-to-speech/generate` with arbitrary `credentialId` in body: endpoint processes request, sends SSE `tts_start` event, only fails when credential doesn't exist , proves code path runs without authentication. ### Impact - Use victim's API keys (OpenAI, ElevenLabs, Azure, Google) without authorization - Burn API credits on the victim's account - Generate unlimited speech content at victim's expense - Combined with credential ID leak from Finding 2, this is trivially exploitable ### Suggested Fix Remove the TTS endpoint from `WHITELIST_URLS` or validate that the credential belongs to the chatflow being used: ```typescript // Only allow credentialId when it matches the chatflow's TTS configuration if (!chatflowId) { return res.status(401).json({ message: 'Authentication required' }) } ``` --- ## References - `packages/server/src/controllers/text-to-speech/index.ts` lines 10-162 - `packages/server/src/utils/constants.ts` line 41 (whitelist entry) ## Credits - Shinobi Security - https://github.com/shinobisecurity
- CVSS 3.1
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Severity from
- GitHub (reviewed advisory)
- Weakness
- CWE-639
- Also known as
- CVE-2026-41279