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Severe, 6 weeks606Projects324

606 severe, 6 weeks · 324 projects

MCP SDKsGHSA-46jr-4wx8-v453

MCP SDKs: resource exhaustion

MCP SDKs

CVE-2026-111768 · Published Oct 20, 2026

High7.5
Fix: upgrade to 1.32.0 or later
GitHub advisory

Summary

In affected versions, servers put no limit on how many array elements and object keys they validated in one request. One HTTP request within the default 4 MiB size limit could exhaust the server's memory, and the process aborted with JavaScript heap out of memory.

No credentials are needed, unless you authenticate requests before they reach the SDK.

Am I affected?

Yes, if clients you do not fully trust can reach your server over HTTP. The risk is highest for McpServer tools whose input contains an array or a record. stdio-only servers are not affected.

Affected versions:

  • @modelcontextprotocol/sdk 1.3.0 through 1.31.0
  • @modelcontextprotocol/server 2.0.0 through 2.2.0

Fix

Upgrade to:

  • 1.x: @modelcontextprotocol/sdk 1.32.0 or later
  • 2.x: @modelcontextprotocol/server 2.3.0 or later

Upgrading alone changes nothing. The patched versions add an McpServer option, maxToolInputElements, that is off by default. Make both of these changes:

1. Set maxToolInputElements just above the largest input your tools need, for example new McpServer(info, { maxToolInputElements: 10_000 }). It counts array elements and object keys in a call's arguments. A call over the limit gets an isError: true result.

2. Lower the request size limit to what your tools need. The option covers tool arguments only, and the size limit covers everything else....

Affected versions

PackageAffectedFixed in
@modelcontextprotocol/sdk
npm
>= 1.3.0, < 1.32.01.32.0
Details and references

### Summary In affected versions, servers put no limit on how many array elements and object keys they validated in one request. One HTTP request within the default 4 MiB size limit could exhaust the server's memory, and the process aborted with `JavaScript heap out of memory`. No credentials are needed, unless you authenticate requests before they reach the SDK. ### Am I affected? Yes, if clients you do not fully trust can reach your server over HTTP. The risk is highest for `McpServer` tools whose input contains an array or a record. stdio-only servers are not affected. Affected versions: - `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` 1.3.0 through 1.31.0 - `@modelcontextprotocol/server` 2.0.0 through 2.2.0 ### Fix Upgrade to: - 1.x: `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` 1.32.0 or later - 2.x: `@modelcontextprotocol/server` 2.3.0 or later **Upgrading alone changes nothing.** The patched versions add an `McpServer` option, `maxToolInputElements`, that is off by default. Make both of these changes: 1. Set `maxToolInputElements` just above the largest input your tools need, for example `new McpServer(info, { maxToolInputElements: 10_000 })`. It counts array elements and object keys in a call's arguments. A call over the limit gets an `isError: true` result. 2. Lower the request size limit to what your tools need. The option covers tool arguments only, and the size limit covers everything else. Set `maxRequestBodySize` on the transport or `createMcpHandler()`. If you parse the body yourself, for example with `express.json()` or Fastify, set that parser's limit. If you cannot upgrade yet, make the second change. `maxRequestBodySize` needs `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` 1.30.1 or `@modelcontextprotocol/server` 2.1.0. Below that, use a reverse proxy.

CVSS 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity from
GitHub (reviewed advisory)
Weakness
CWE-770
Also known as
CVE-2026-111768

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