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Severe, 6 weeks2431Projects328

2431 severe, 6 weeks · 328 projects

Red HatCVE-2026-82976

Red Hat image-customization-controller used: improper access control

Red Hat

CVE-2026-82976 · Published Nov 3, 2026 · updated Nov 9, 2026

High7.1
No fix yet
Red Hat advisory

A flaw was found in the image-customization-controller used in OpenShift's bare metal provisioning stack. The controller registers an HTTP file server on port 8084 with no authentication. The custom imageFileSystem implementation exposes a browsable HTML directory listing of all registered images at the root path. The only access control on per-host images is the random UUID filename; the directory listing discloses those UUIDs to any caller on the provisioning network. Each served image embeds an Ignition config containing the base64-encoded cluster pull secret, optional IRONIC_RAMDISK_SSH_KEY, proxy settings, and per-host NetworkManager keyfiles. An adjacent network attacker can enumerate all image UUIDs via directory listing, download any image, extract the embedded Ignition config, and recover the cluster pull secret and SSH key.

Evidence

pkg/imagehandler/imagefilesystem.go — root directory is browsable and enumerates all UUID image names

```go

func (f *imageFileSystem) Readdir(n int) ([]fs.FileInfo, error) {

f.mu.Lock()

defer f.mu.Unlock()

result := []fs.FileInfo{}

for _, im := range f.images {

result = append(result, im)

}

return result, nil

}

func (f *imageFileSystem) Open(name string) (http.File, error) {

f.log.Info("Open", "path", name)

if name == "/" {

return f, nil

}

...

`

**cmd/controller/main.go...

Affected versions

PackageAffectedFixed in
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4
Product
all versionsNo fix yet
all versionsNo fix yet
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 5
Product
all versionsNo fix yet
Details and references

A flaw was found in the image-customization-controller used in OpenShift's bare metal provisioning stack. The controller registers an HTTP file server on port 8084 with no authentication. The custom imageFileSystem implementation exposes a browsable HTML directory listing of all registered images at the root path. The only access control on per-host images is the random UUID filename; the directory listing discloses those UUIDs to any caller on the provisioning network. Each served image embeds an Ignition config containing the base64-encoded cluster pull secret, optional IRONIC_RAMDISK_SSH_KEY, proxy settings, and per-host NetworkManager keyfiles. An adjacent network attacker can enumerate all image UUIDs via directory listing, download any image, extract the embedded Ignition config, and recover the cluster pull secret and SSH key. ### Evidence **pkg/imagehandler/imagefilesystem.go — root directory is browsable and enumerates all UUID image names** ```go func (f *imageFileSystem) Readdir(n int) ([]fs.FileInfo, error) { f.mu.Lock() defer f.mu.Unlock() result := []fs.FileInfo{} for _, im := range f.images { result = append(result, im) } return result, nil } func (f *imageFileSystem) Open(name string) (http.File, error) { f.log.Info("Open", "path", name) if name == "/" { return f, nil } ... ``` **cmd/controller/main.go — file server bound on all interfaces without auth or TLS** ```go http.Handle("/", http.FileServer(imageServer.FileSystem())) go func() { server := &http.Server{ Addr: imagesBindAddr, // default ":8084" ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second, } err := server.ListenAndServe() ``` **pkg/ignition/service_config.go:94-100 — pull secret is embedded in every served image** ```go func (b *ignitionBuilder) authFile() ignition_config_types_32.File { source := "data:;base64," + strings.TrimSpace(b.ironicAgentPullSecret) return ignition_config_types_32.File{ Node: ignition_config_types_32.Node{Path: "/etc/authfile.json"}, ... ``` ### Attack Pattern Adjacent provisioning-network client → GET / lists UUID image names → download ISO/initramfs → extract embedded Ignition → recover cluster pull secret and SSH key.

CVSS 3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
Severity from
the vendor (its own CVE record or advisory)
Weakness
CWE-548

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