Red Hat a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx: weakly protected credentials
The Vert.x HTTP client transport (a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx) hand-rolls a POST redirect follower that, when the documented PostBuilder.followRedirects(true) opt-in is enabled, re-issues the redirected request with the full request header map copied verbatim and performs no credential stripping and no same-authority check. A malicious, compromised, or mistyped agent that returns a 30x response with an absolute cross-host Location causes the client to forward the standard Authorization header (Bearer/Basic/OAuth) — plus every other header, including the allowlisted API-key headers — to the attacker-controlled authority. This breaks the project's own cross-transport invariant (SECURITY.md §8, OkHttpPostRedirectHeaderLeakTest) that credentials are stripped on cross-authority redirects even when redirects are followed. The sibling JDK and OkHttp/Android transports strip Authorization; Vert.x uniquely does not. This is a "fix introduced the bug" variant — the follower was added by the GHSA-9rhm hardening PR (3ae82912, refined by a5e76a0b).
Affected versions
| Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx Product | >= 1.3.2.Final, <= 1.4.0.Final | No fix yet |
Details and references
- CVSS 3.1
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
- Severity from
- the vendor (its own CVE record or advisory)
- Weakness
- CWE-522